|
Reason: the
Intellect
Practical
Intelligence
- know how
- wisdom
Theoretical
Contemplative
Intelligence
- induction
- deduction
“But
since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from
matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it
follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand
are not actually intelligible. … We must therefore assign on the part
of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by
abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the
necessity for an active intellect.”
(Aquinas)
|
Review: psyche -- soul -- the
form/functioning of the body
Vegetative faculty: insofar as it lives
(i.e., takes nourishment, strives to reproduce, etc.)
sensitive faculty: insofar as it senses
(i.e., reflects the sensible forms from things round about it for the
purposes of navigating its environment):
intellectual faculty (aka mind or reason):
insofar as it conceives and judges (reflects the intelligible forms of
things)
Issue concerning the difference between
sensitive (e.g., in eyes) and nonsensitive reflection (e.g., in mirrors) of
"sensible forms": a kind of uptake by intelligence must be added?
“But smelling is more than such an
affection [as of the air] by what is odorous -- what more? Is
not the answer that, while the air owing to the momentary duration of the
action upon it of what is odorous does itself become perceptible to the sense
of smell, smelling is an observing of the result produced?” (Aristotle, On the Soul ii:12)
DISCUSSION: INTIMATIONS OF MORTALITY:
TROPES & SOULS
"[W]e can dismiss as unnecessary the
question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to
ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or
generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter."
Controversy about the "active
intellect" (430a17ff)
"When [active reason] has been
separated it is that only which it is in essence, and this alone is immortal
and eternal. We do not remember, however, because active reason is
impassible, but the passive reason is perishable, and without active reason
nothing thinks.
Genesis of Reason out of Sensation
Lower faculties not encapsulated:
vegetative and sensitive functions are mediated by the cognitive
Reason is beholden to sensation (as form
to proximate matter)
thought the form of forms (uses sensory
and intellectual images)
sense -> memory -> experience
(habit) -> skill (expert habit) & knowledge
"Thus it is clear that we must get to
know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense
perception implants the universal is inductive."
Nature of Reason
Conception: "thinking of the simple
objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is
impossible"
Judgment: "where the alternative of
true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of objects of
thought in a quasi-unity"
Segue: Logic, the science of
reasoning; ideal of correct reasoning illuminates what is reasoning:
things are known by their working & their power.
|
1. "[Perception] of the special objects
of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is
possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where
there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility."
2. "[S]ince everything is a possible
object of thought, mind . . . must be pure from all admixture . . . can have
no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity."
3. "[T]he soul is analogous to the hand;
for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and
sense the form of sensible things."
4. "Since according to common agreement
there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial
magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the
abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things.
Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense,
and (2) when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware
of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except that
they contain no matter."
5. "So out of sense-perception comes to
be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same
thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single
experience. From experience again -- i.e., from the universal now stabilized
in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single
identity within them all -- originate the skill of the craftsman and the
knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of becoming and
knowledge in the sphere of being."
6. “The case of [active] mind is different;
it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be
incapable of being destroyed.”
|
|
Logic: Science
of Inference
Square of Opposition
 UA
 UN
 PA
 PN
|
Inference: combination of judgments to
arrive at further judgments
Premises and Conclusions
combined judgments are called premises
{3}
the judgments arrived at are called conclusions
Correctness of Judgment = Truth
Correctness of Inference: Truth
Preservation
Standard of deductive Validity: Truth of
the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion
If the premises are true, so must the
conclusion be.
There are formal principles of
validity:
Syllogistic: articulates such principles holding for
certain inferences: i.e., those involving
three categorical judgments (or
propositions) {3}
two premises
one conclusion
with three terms -- names of
individuals or univocal predicates each occurring twice.
Correspondence Theory of Truth {1}
Laws of Thought: Contradiction; excluded
middle.
|
NOTES
1.
"To say
of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; to say of
what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false."
2.
“Things
are said to be named `equivocally’ when though they have a common name, the
definition corresponding to the name differs for each. … On the
other hand things are said to be named `univocally’ which have both the name
and the definition … in common.”
3.
”A premiss
then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another.
This is either universal or particular or indefinite. By universal I mean the statement that something belongs to all or none of
something else; by particular that it belongs to some or not
to some or not to all; by indefinite that it does or does not
belong, without any mark to show whether it is universal or
particular, e.g. 'contraries are subjects of the same
science', or 'pleasure is not good'.”
4.
"It is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be."
|
|
Ethics
VIRTUES AS
MEANS BETWEEN EXCESS & DEFECT
= BRAVE
- RASH
+ COWARDLY
= FRIENDLY
- SANDOFFISH
+ OBSEQUIOUS
= GENEROUS
- STINGY
+ EXTRAVAGANT
= JUST
- LENIENT
+ HARSHN
= PROUD
- SHY
+ PRESUMPTUOUS
= HONEST
- DISHONEST
+ TACTLESS
But
to feel [and do things] at the right times, with reference to the right
objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right
way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of
virtue.
|
Naturalism: the good is that at which all
things aim.
Relativity of Good: what's good is
self-actualization: which depends on the kind of "selves"
concerned: good paperweights are bad kites
No Univocal Form of the Good (no single
concept the word "good" expresses). Goodness relative to Type
(like "large"). This is a kind of ambiguity (compare the
"bank" argument). The argument below commits the fallacy of
four terms because it equivocates on "small": small(1) = "for
and elephant", small(2) = "for an animal" {1}
Dumbo is a small elephant
Elephants are animals
Dumbo is a small animal
Aristotle's Ethics Seeks the Human
Good {6}
The human good can be adduced from actual
human pursuits, naturally.
WTJ: The good for any thing is that which
truly satisfies that thing. {9}
this final satisfaction = the things aim
or purpose {5}
The chief human good is happiness
{7}
an inclusive good: the addition argument
activity in accordance with virtue {8}
virtue is a mean between excess and
deficiency
doing with regard to specific human
activities
it's (an art of) doing
to . . .the right person
to the right extent
at the right time
with the right motive
in the right way
as sense guided by reason (especially
habits formed under the tutelage of reason) determines.
Practical Syllogism
MAJOR PREMISE (re: the principle): Such is
best.
MINOR PREMISE (re: the particulars): This
is such.
CONCLUDING ACTION: Therefore, I do this
“forthwith”.
Case of Weakness of the Will
(Incontinence) {2}{3}
To quit smoking is best. {10}
Not lighting now would be quitting
Nevertheless, I light up forthwith.
Analysis: moved by immediate isolated appetite (for a smoke, now)
rather than comprehensive wish (for long run health & happiness).
Gimme smoke.
Lighting up now would be smoking.
Forthwith, I light up.
Wish: rational appetite: determines the
end to be pursued
foresightfully
comprehensively: what's best all things
considered.
Choice & Deliberation {11}
what deliberation decides to be the best
means to our end
we choose
some acts are voluntary but not deliberate
The highest human activity is speculative
thought: contemplation. {8}
|
1. "The good then is not some common
element answering to one idea."
2. "[ M]ind is never found producing movement without
appetite (for wish is a kind of appetite; and when movement is produced
according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can
originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of
appetite."
3. "I want to drink, says appetite; this
is drink, says sense, or imagination or thought. Straightaway I
drink."
4. "[T]hat which appears good to the
good man is thought to be really so."
5. "Every art and every inquiry, and
similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for
this reason the good has been rightly declared to be that at which all things
aim."
6. "If then there is some end of the
things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired
for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something
else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our
desire would be empty and vain) this must be the good and the chief
good."
7. "[Happiness] we choose for itself and
never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, and reason, and
every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for it nothing resulted from
them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the
sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy."
8. "[A] clearer account of what
[happiness or the chief good] is . . . might perhaps be given if we could
first ascertain the function of man."
9. "[F]or all things that have a
function the good and the "well" are supposed to reside in that
function, so too it would seem for man."
10. "The use of language by incontinent men means no more
than its utterance by actors on the stage."
11. “That which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of
[deliberation] and that which is last in the process of thinking is the
beginning of the action."
|