fall 2004: : PHL112
Midterm Study Guide

1.      Water is the cause of all things. (Thales)

2.      All things are filled with gods. (Thales)

3.      [The material cause of everything] is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but a nature different from them and infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the world within them. (Anaximander)

4.      Just as our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world. (Anaximenes)

5.      The world . . . was ever, is now, and always will be an everlasting Fire. (Heraclitus)

6.      You cannot step in the same river twice, for fresh waters are always flowing in upon you. (Heraclitus)

7.      All things are in motion, nothing steadfastly is. (Heraclitus)

8.      To God all things are good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right. (Heraclitus)

9.      In the beginning, man was born from animals of another species. (Anaximander)

10.  What is is.  What is not, is not. (Parmenides)

11.  What need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be all together or not at all. (Parmenides)

12.  If there were a many, these would have to be of the same kind as I say the one is. (Melissus)

13.  Before any distance can be traversed, half the distance must be traversed. These half-distances are infinite in number. It is impossible to traverse distances infinite in number. (Zeno of Elea)

14.  [H]eads spring up without necks and arms wander bare, bereft of shoulders. [T]hese things joined together as each might chance, and many other things continuously besides arose. (Empedocles)

15.  How can hair come from what is not hair, or flesh from what is not flesh? (Anaxagoras)

16.  In everything there is a portion of everything. (Anaxagoras)

17.  The small too is infinite. (Anaxagoras)

18.  Mind began to revolve first from a small beginning . . . In this revolution now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the aether that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated from the dense, the warm from the cold, and the light from the dark. (Anaxagoras)

19.  Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it cannot be that what is should cease to be by being cut. (Anaxagoras)

20.  For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous [mind] has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous [mind] had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. (Anaxagoras)

21.  And Nous [mind] set in order all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the aether that are separated off. (Anaxagoras)

22.  Fire is composed of twenty four right angled triangles surrounded by four equilaterals. (Pythagoras)

23.  "Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, of things that are not, that they are not." (Protagoras)

24.  "Whatever practices seem right and laudable to any particular State are so for that state, so long as it holds by them."(Protagoras)

25.  "In this way [in that some beliefs are more expedient] it is true that some men are wiser than others and that no one thinks falsely." (Protagoras)

26.  "[Tragedy is] a deception which is better to cause than not to cause; to succumb to it shows greater powers of artistic appreciation than not to." (Gorgias)

27.  "First and foremost, [I say] that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man." (Gorgias)

28.  "The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies." (Gorgias)

29.  "[Justice] means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger party" (Thrasymachus)

30.  "What is not does exist, no less than what is." (Democritus)

31.  "[All that exists are] atoms and empty space; everything else is merely thought to exist." (Democritus)

32.  "In name there is sweet, in name there is bitter; in name there is warm and in name there is cold; in name there color. But really, there are atoms and the void." (Democritus)

33.  "All things happen by virtue of necessity, the vortex being the cause of the creation of all things." (Democritus)

34.  "By the senses we in truth know nothing sure, but only something that changes according to the disposition of the body and of the things that enter into it or resist it." (Democritus, Frag. 9)

35.  "[W]hen investigation must be carried farther into that which is still finer (than the minimum sensible) then arises the genuine way of knowing which has a finer organ of thought." (Democritus)

36.  "The good and the true are the same for all people, but the pleasant is different for different people." (Democritus)

37.  "If you fight against all your sensations you will have no standard by which to refer and thus no means of judging even those sensations which you pronounce false." (Epicurus)

38.  "It must needs be that the first-bodies swerve a little; yet no more than the very least, lest we be imagining a sideways movement, and the truth refute it." (Epicurus)

39.  “A man who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life, even for a little while, must be a private citizen, not a public man." (Socrates)

40.  “The unexamined life is not worth living.”  (Socrates)

41.  “And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, thinking one knows what one does not know."  (Socrates)

42.  "[A]nd if . . . I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not knowing . . . I do not think I know."  (Socrates)

43.  “When people make a wrong choice of pleasures and pains – that is, of good and evil – the cause of their mistake is lack of knowledge. … So that is what 'being mastered by pleasure' really is--ignorance, and most serious ignorance.” (Socrates)

44.  "There is surely a very strange and confusion of causes and conditions in all this.  It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say ... that I do as I do because of them, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking."  (Socrates)

45.  "I was asking about courage and cowardice in general.  And I will . . . once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage?"  (Socrates)

46.  "Courage is knowing what not to fear."  (Socrates)

47.  "[I] remind you of the distinction we drew . . . between the multiplicity of things that we call good or beautiful or whatever it may be and, on the other hand, Goodness itself or Beauty itself and so on.  Corresponding to each of these sets of many things, we postulate a single Form or real essence, as we call it."  (Plato)

48.  "[Geometers] are not reasoning, for example, about this particular square and diagonal which they have drawn, but about the Square and the Diagonal; and so in all cases."  (Plato)

49.  "[T]he many things we say can be seen, but are not objects of rational thought; whereas the forms are objects of thought, but invisible."  (Plato)

50.  "Take a divided line divided into two equal parts, one to represent the visible order, the other the invisible; and divide each part again in the same proportion, symbolizing degrees of comparative clarity and obscurity.  And now you may take, as corresponding to the four sections, these four states of mind: intelligence for the highest, thinking for the second, belief for the third, and for the last imagining.  These you may arrange as the terms in a proportion, assigning to each a degree of clearness and certainty corresponding to the measure in which their objects possess truth and reality." (Plato)

51.  "The prison dwelling corresponds to the region revealed to us through the sense of sight, and the fire-light within it to the power of the Sun.  The upward journey you may take as standing for the upward journey of the soul into the region of the intelligible.  In the world of knowledge the last thing to be perceived is the essential Form of Goodness.  Once it is perceived, the conclusion must follow that, for all things, this is the cause of whatever it right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world, and the parent of intelligence and truth." (Plato)

52.  "And so with the objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality."

53.  "[I]f a man refuses to admit that Forms of things exist or to distinguish a definite Form in every case, he will have nothing on which to fix his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has a character which is always the same; and in so doing he will completely destroy the significance of discourse." (Plato)

54.  "[If] the thing which is like [must] share with the thing that is like it in one and the same thing ...[and] that in which like things share, so as to be alike, is just the Form …[then] nothing can be like the Form, nor can the Form be like anything.  Otherwise a second Form will always make its appearance over and above the first Form; and if that second Form is like anything, yet a third; and there will be no emergence of these fresh forms, if the form is to be like that which partakes of it." (Plato)

55.  "The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts." (Plato)

56.  "[A]ll things are ordered systematically by Him who cares for the World-all with a view to the preservation and excellence of the Whole, whereof each part, so far as it can, does and suffers what is proper to it." (Plato)

57.  "[T]he world is like, above all things, to that Living Creature of which all other living creatures, severally, and in their families, are parts."

58.  "Do you see the inference -- that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink?" (Plato)

59.  "The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, [436c] we know that they are really not the same, but different.... And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same." (Plato)

60.  "And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason; -- but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed, s a sort of thing which, I believe, you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one else?" (Plato)

61.  "[T]he human charioteer drives his [horses] in a pair; and one of them is noble and of noble breed, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble breed; and the driving of them of necessity gives a great deal of trouble to him." (Plato)

62.  "The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts." (Plato)

63.  Then in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them. (Plato)

64.  “[T]he individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles ….” (Plato)

65.  “[W]e must have knowledge of equivalence and nonequivalence before we use our senses, or we would not be able to make any sense of them.” (Plato)

66.  “[G]od is not the author of all things … of the evils the cause is to be found elsewhere.” (Plato)

67.  "All men by nature desire to know." (Aristotle)

68.  ""It must be held to be impossible that the substance, and that of which it is the substance, should exist apart; how, therefore, can the Ideas, being the substance of things, exist apart?" (Aristotle)

69.  "And to say that [the Forms] are patterns, and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors." (Aristotle)

70.  "By the term `universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by `individual' that which is not thus predicated." (Aristotle)

71.  "It seems impossible that any universal term should be the name of a substance. For ... the substance of each thing is that which is peculiar to it, which does not belong to anything else; but the universal is common, since that is called universal which is such as to belong to more than one thing." (Aristotle)

72.  "[Forms] help in no wise towards the knowledge of the other things (or they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them." (Aristotle)

73.  "Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable in a subject nor present in a subject; for instance the individual man or horse." (Aristotle)

74.  "Everything but primary substances is either predicable of primary substance or present in a primary substance." (Aristotle)

75.  "[Natural things] present a feature in which they differ from other things which are not constituted by nature.  Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place), or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration." (Aristotle)

76.  "Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies; for they are the principles of all other bodies." (Aristotle)

77.  In one sense, what is described as a cause is that material out of which a thing comes into being and which remains present in it. Such, for instance, is bronze in the case of a statue … (Aristotle)

78.  In another sense, the form and pattern are a cause, that is to say the statement of the essenc­e … such, for instance, in the case of the octave, are the ratio of two to one …. (Aristotle)

79.  Then there is the initiating source of change or rest: the person who advises an action, for instance, is a cause of the action; the father is the cause of his child; and in general, what produces is the cause of what is changed. (Aristotle)

80.  Then there is what is a cause insofar as it is an end (telos): this is the purpose of a thing; in this sense, health, for instance, is the cause of a man's going for a walk. (Aristotle)

81.  "[F]or any living thing . . .the most natural act is the production of another like itself ... in order that, so far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine." (Aristotle)

82.  "There is something which moves without being moved, being eternal substance, and actuality. And the object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved." (Aristotle)

83.  "Now if you take away from a living being action, and still more production, what is left but contemplation? Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative." (Aristotle)

84.  "It must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things) and its thinking is a thinking on thinking." (Aristotle)

85.  "[T]he final causes cannot go on ad infinitum -- walking being for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake of something else, and so one thing always for the sake of another." (Aristotle)

86.  "[T]here must necessarily be some . . . thing which, while it has the capacity of moving something else, is itself unmoved and exempt from all change." (Aristotle)

87.  "Of natural bodies some have life in them, others not; by life we mean self-nutrition and growth (with its correlative decay).?  (Aristotle)

88.  "[W]e can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one: it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one, or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter." (Aristotle)

89.  "Each sense has one kind of object which it discerns, and never errs in reporting that what is before it is color or sound (though it may err as to what it is that is colored or where that is, or what it is that is sounding, or where that is." (Aristotle)

90.  "The sentient faculty never exists without the nutritive, but the nutritive may exist without the sentient, as in the case of plants." (Aristotle)

91.  "[T]he soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized." (Aristotle)

92.  The case of [active] mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed.?  (Aristotle)

93.  "[Perception] of the special objects of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals, while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility."  (Aristotle)

94.  "But smelling is more than such an affection [as of the air] by what is odorous -- what more? Is not the answer that, while the air owing to the momentary duration of the action upon it of what is odorous does itself become perceptible to the sense of smell, smelling is an observing of the result produced." (Aristotle)

95.  "[S]ince everything is a possible object of thought, mind . . . must be pure from all admixture . . . can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity."  (Aristotle)

96.  "[T]he soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things." (Aristotle)

97.  "Since according to common agreement there is nothing outside and separate in existence from sensible spatial magnitudes, the objects of thought are in the sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and all the states and affections of sensible things.  Hence (1) no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, and (2) when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents except that they contain no matter." (Aristotle)

98.  "So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitutes a single experience.  From experience again -- i.e., from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all -- originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of becoming and knowledge in the sphere of being."  (Aristotle)

99.  The case of [active] mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. (Aristotle)

100.   "To say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true; to say of what is that it is not, or what is not that it is, is false." (Aristotle)

101.   "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." (Aristotle)

102.   "When [active reason] has been separated it is that only which it is in essence, and this alone is immortal and eternal. We do not remember, however, because active reason is impassible, but the passive reason is perishable, and without active reason nothing thinks. (Aristotle)

103.   "Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense perception implants the universal is inductive." (Aristotle)

104.   "[T]hinking of the simple objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible" (Aristotle)

105.   "Where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity" (Aristotle)

106.   "The good then is not some common element answering to one idea." (Aristotle)

107.   "[ M]ind is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a kind of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite." (Aristotle)

108.   "I want to drink, says appetite; this is drink, says sense, or imagination or thought. Straightaway I drink." (Aristotle)

109.   "[T]hat which appears good to the good man is thought to be really so." (Aristotle)

110.   "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has been rightly declared to be that at which all things aim." (Aristotle)

111.   "If then there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain) this must be the good and the chief good." (Aristotle)

112.   "[Happiness] we choose for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, and reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for it nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy." (Aristotle)

113.   "[A] clearer account of what [happiness or the chief good] is ... might perhaps be given if we could first ascertain the function of man." (Aristotle)

114.   "[F]or all things that have a function the `good' and the `well' are supposed to reside in that function, so too it would seem for man."

115.   "The use of language by incontinent men means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage." (Aristotle)

116.   "That which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of [deliberation] and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action." (Aristotle)

117.   "And since the last premise [e.g., this is fattening] is a belief about something perceptible, this is what the incontinent person does not have when he is being affected. Or rather, the way he has it is not knowledge of it, but ... [merely] saying the words, as the drunk says the words of Empedocles." (Aristotle)

118.   But to feel [and do things] at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. (Aristotle)