Selection from David Hume's
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
SECTION VIII OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY
PART I
IT might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed
and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science, and
philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been
agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two
thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject
of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions
of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the
mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But
if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite
opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has
been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that
there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix
different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties
of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise
nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it
were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they
could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when
they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides,
in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists.
It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely
beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin
of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits,
they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive
at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of
common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the
dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the
antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each
other. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning
liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not
much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant,
have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that
a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the
whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on
all hands, and has led philosophers into such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry,
that it is no wonder, if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to
turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question, from which he can expect
neither instruction or entertainment. But the state of the argument here
proposed may, perhaps, serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty,
promises at least some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb
his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning. I hope, therefore, to make
it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity
and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on
these terms; and that the whole controversy, has hitherto turned merely
upon words. We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity. It
is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is actuated
by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined
by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in such particular circumstances,
could possibly have resulted from it. The degree and direction of every
motion is, by the laws of nature, prescribed with such exactness that a
living creature may as soon arise from the shock of two bodies as motion
in any other degree or direction than what is actually produced by it.
Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of necessity, we must
consider whence that idea arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies.
It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually shifted
in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each other,
but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had
been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least
idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these objects. We might say,
upon such a supposition, that one object or event has followed another;
not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect
must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning concerning
the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the
memory and senses remain the only canals, by which the knowledge of any
real existence could possibly have access to the mind. Our idea, therefore,
of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable
in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined
together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the
appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that
necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction
of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other,
we have no notion of any necessity or connexion. If it appear, therefore,
that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that
these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and
in the operations of mind; it must follow, that all mankind have ever agreed
in the doctrine of necessity, and that they have hitherto disputed, merely
for not understanding each other. As to the first circumstance, the constant
and regular conjunction of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves
by the following considerations: It is universally acknowledged that
there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and
ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and
operations. The same motives always produce the same actions: the same
events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity,
friendship, generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various
degrees, and distributed through society, have been, from the beginning
of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises,
which have ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments,
inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well the
temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken
in transferring to the former most of the observations which you have
made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times
and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular.
Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles
of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and
situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our
observations and become acquainted with the regular springs of human
action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and
revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician
or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science, in the same
manner as the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with
the nature of plants, minerals, and other external objects, by the ex-
periments which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and
other elements, examined by Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those
which at present lie under our observation than the men described by Polybius
and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world. Should a traveller,
returning from a far country, bring us an account of men, wholly different
from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men, who were entirely divested
of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no pleasure but friendship,
generosity, and public spirit; we should immediately, from these circumstances,
detect the falsehood, and prove him a liar, with the same certainty as
if he had stuffed his narration with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles
and prodigies. And if we would explode any forgery in history, we cannot
make use of a more convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions
ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and
that no human motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to
such a conduct. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected,
when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he
was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his super-
natural force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily
and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions
as well as in the operations of body. Hence likewise the benefit of that
experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company,
in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate
our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we
mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their
actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation
of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations.
The general observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us
the clue of human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies.
Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass
for the specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be
allowed their proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness,
so often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom
in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station.
But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment
which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible
to collect any general observations concerning mankind; and no experience,
however accurately digested by reflection, would ever serve to any purpose.
Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his calling than the young beginner
but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun,
rain, and earth towards the production of vegetables; and experience teaches
the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and
directed. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions
should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same circumstances,
will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance
for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such a uniformity
in every particular, is found in no part of nature. On the contrary, from
observing the variety of conduct in different men, we are enabled to form
a greater variety of maxims, which still suppose a degree of uniformity
and regularity. Are the manners of men different in different ages and
countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education, which
mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established
character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that
of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters
which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she preserves with
constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified
in the different periods of his life, from infancy to old age? This affords
room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our
sentiments and inclinations, and the different maxims which prevail in
the different ages of human creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar
to each individual, have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our
acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could
never teach us their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with
regard to them. I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to
have no regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to
all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government
of men. But if we would willingly know what judgment should be formed of
such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider the sentiments
commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear
in the course of nature, and the operations of external objects. All causes
are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer,
who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim, as well as
the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.
The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute
the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes
the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they meet with no
impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that, almost
in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety of springs and
principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness,
find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed
from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of contrary
causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation,
when they remark that, upon an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects
always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual
opposition. A peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any
clock or watch than to say that it does not commonly go right: But an artist
easily perceives that the same force in the spring or pendulum has always
the same influence on the wheels; but fails of its usual effects, perhaps
by reason of a grain of dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement.
From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a
maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary,
and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret
opposition of contrary causes. Thus, for instance, in the human body, when
the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation; when
medicines operate not with their wonted powers; when irregular events follow
from any particular cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised
at the matter, nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity
and uniformity of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted.
They know that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many
secret powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension:
That to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that
therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can
be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest
regularity in its internal operations and government. The philosopher,
if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning to the actions and volitions
of intelligent agents. The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of
men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular
circumstance of their character and situation. A person of an obliging
disposition gives a peevish answer: But he has the toothache, or has not
dined. A stupid fellow discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage:
But he has met with a sudden piece of good fortune. Or even when an action,
as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by
the person himself or by others; we know, in general, that the characters
of men are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in
a manner, the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable,
in a more particular manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for
their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy.
The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding
these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, cloud,
and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed by steady
principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity and enquiry.
Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary
actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect
in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been
universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject
of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is from past
experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, and as
we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which we find
to have always been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove that this
experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we draw inferences
concerning them. But in order to throw the argument into a greater variety
of lights we shall also insist, though briefly, on this latter topic. The
mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human
action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference
to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the
intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who labours alone, expects
at least the protection of the magistrate, to ensure him the enjoyment
of the fruits of his labour. He also expects that, when he carries his
goods to market, and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find purchasers,
and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply
him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In
proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse
with others more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes
of life, a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from
the proper motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions
they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as
in their reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that
men, as well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations,
the same that they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the
labour of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the
tools which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations
disappointed. In short, this experimental inference and reasoning concerning
the actions of others enters so much into human life that no man, while
awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not reason, therefore,
to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the doctrine of necessity
according to the foregoing definition and explication of it? Nor have
philosophers even entertained a different opinion from the people in this
particular. For, not to mention that almost every action of their life
supposes that opinion, there are even few of the speculative parts of learn-
ing to which it is not essential. What would become of history, had we
not a dependence on the veracity of the historian according to the experience
which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws
and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where
would be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain
or determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments
had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ
our criticism upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce
the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to
such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible,
therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging
the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motive to voluntary
actions, from characters to conduct. And indeed, when we consider how aptly
natural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of argument,
we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and
derived from the same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor
interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers
the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded;
and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone
and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The
same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly
from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of
the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: the refusal
of the soldiers to consent to his escape; the action of the executioner;
the separation of the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and
death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions;
but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link
to another: Nor is it less certain of the future event than if it were
connected with the objects present to the memory or senses, by a train
of causes, cemented together by what we are pleased to call a physical
necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind,
whether the united objects be motives, volition, and actions; or figure
and motion. We may change the name of things; but their nature and their
operation on the understanding never change. Were a man, whom I know to
be honest and opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friendship, to
come into my house, where I am surrounded with my servants, I rest assured
that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my
silver standish; and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the
house itself, which is new, and solidly built and founded.--But he may
have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy.--So may a sudden earthquake
arise, and shake and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change
the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not
to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: and
this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if
he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he will
not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy
can give the least possibility to the former event, which is so contrary
to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his
purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may as well expect
that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will find it untouched
an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of
a similar nature, attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned
to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations.
I have frequently considered, what could possibly be the reason why all
mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the doctrine
of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet discovered
such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather shown a propensity,
in all ages, to profess the contrary opinion. The matter, I think, may
be accounted for after the following manner. If we examine the operations
of body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find
that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this
relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly
conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary transition,
from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this
conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny
of this subject, men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that
they penetrate farther into the powers of nature, and perceive something
like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again
they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds,
and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence
apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which result
from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence.
But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any
kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects, and the consequent
inference of the mind from one to another, and finding that these two circumstances
are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions; we may be more
easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this
reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing
necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection,
that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity,
according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected,
nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only, perhaps,
be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter,
some farther connexion between the cause and effect; and connexion that
has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it
be so or not, can only appear upon examination; and it is incumbent on
these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing
that necessity, and pointing it out to us in the operations of material
causes. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this
question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining
the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the
operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question,
namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter; and try
whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except
that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of
the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality,
the whole of that necessity, which we conceive in matter, and if these
circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations
of the mind, the dispute is at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth
merely verbal. But as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some
farther idea of necessity and causation in the operations of external
objects; at the same time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary
actions of the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to
any determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition.
The only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the
narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to convince
ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction and inference
above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with difficulty we
are induced to fix such narrow limits to human understanding: but we can
afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the
actions of the will. For as it is evident that these have a regular con-
junction with motives and circumstances and characters, and as we always
draw inferences from one to the other, we must be obliged to acknowledge
in words that necessity, which we have already avowed, in every deliberation
of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.[1] But to
proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty
and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious
science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have
ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity,
and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely
verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?
We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives,
inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain
degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference
by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain
and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean
a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the
will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to
move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed
to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then,
is no subject of dispute. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we
should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; First, that it
be consistent with plain matter of fact; secondly, that it be consistent
with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition
intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion
with regard to it. It is universally allowed that nothing exists without
a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is
a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a
being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some
not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one
define a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a necessary
connexion with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the
idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the whole
controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received,
this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction
with each other, we should never have entertained any notion of cause and
effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding,
which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehension of. Whoever
attempts a definition of cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will
be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous
to the term which he endeavours to define.[2] And if the definition above
mentioned be admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint,
is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no
existence.
PART II
THERE is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more blameable,
than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis,
by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality.
When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false; but it
is not certain that an opinion is false, because it is of dangerous consequence.
Such topics, therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as serving nothing
to the discovery of truth, but only to make the person of an antagonist
odious. This I observe in general, without pretending to draw any advantage
from it. I frankly submit to an examination of this kind, and shall venture
to affirm that the doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above
explained, are not only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential
to its support. Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two
definitions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists
either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference
of the understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both
these senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally,
though tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been
allowed to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to
deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those
inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with like
motives, inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in which
any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to give the
name of necessity to this property of human actions: but as long as the
meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: or that he will
maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of
matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no consequence to
morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics.
We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other
necessity or connexion in the actions of body: But surely we ascribe nothing
to the actions of the mind, but what everyone does, and must readily allow
of. We change no circumstance in the received orthodox system with regard
to the will, but only in that with regard to material objects and causes.
Nothing, therefore, can be more innocent, at least, than this doctrine.
All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a
fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence
on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. We
may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it is usually conjoined
with the action, it must be esteemed a cause, and be looked upon as an
instance of that necessity, which we would here establish. The only proper
object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature, endowed with thought
and consciousness; and when any criminal or injurious actions excite
that passion, it is only by their relation to the person, or connexion
with him. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and
where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition
of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour,
if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable;
they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: but the
person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in
him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind
them, it is impossible he can, upon their account, become the object of
punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies
necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after
having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth,
nor is his character anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not
derived from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof
of the depravity of the other. Men are not blamed for such actions as they
perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why?
but because the principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate
in them alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily
and unpremeditatedly than for such as proceed from deliberation. For
what reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or principle
in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character.
Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation
of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? but by asserting
that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal
principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of these principles,
they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal. But,
except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and
consequently never were criminal. It will be equally easy to prove, and
from the same arguments, that liberty, according to that definition above
mentioned, in which all men agree, is also essential to morality, and that
no human actions, where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities,
or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions
are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications
of the internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that
they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from
these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence. I
pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this theory,
with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other objections, derived
from topics which have not here been treated of. It may be said, for instance,
that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with
the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes,
pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all
to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere
in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at
the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is
the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine,
and placed all beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent
event, by an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore,
either can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a
cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in
the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and
author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences
whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued
chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite,
who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the rest, and must
both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong to them. Our clear
and unalterable ideas of morality establish this rule, upon unquestionable
reasons, when we examine the consequences of any human action; and these
reasons must still have greater force when applied to the volitions and
intentions of a Being infinitely wise and powerful. Ignorance or impotence
may be pleaded for so limited a creature as man; but those imperfections
have no place in our Creator. He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all
those actions of men, which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must
therefore conclude, either that they are not criminal, or that the Deity,
not man, is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is absurd
and impious, it follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced
cannot possibly be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An
absurd consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd;
in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause,
if the connexion between them be necessary and inevitable. This objection
consists of two parts, which we shall examine separately; First, that,
if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain, to the Deity,
they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that
Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is
altogether good and laudable. Or, Secondly, if they be criminal, we must
retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and
must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude
in all his creatures. The answer to the first objection seems obvious and
convincing. There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny
of all the phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as
one system, is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect
benevolence; and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result
to all created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill
or misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this
benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity
himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater
ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this
theory, some philosophers, and the ancient Stoics among the rest, derived
a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught their pupils
that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, goods to the
universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could comprehend the whole
system of nature, every event became an object of joy and exultation. But
though this topic be specious and sublime, it was soon found in practice
weak and ineffectual. You would surely more irritate than appease a man
lying under the racking pains of the gout by preaching up to him the rectitude
of those general laws, which produced the malignant humours in his body,
and led them through the proper canals, to the sinews and nerves, where
they now excite such acute torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment,
please the imagination of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and
security; but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though
undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain
their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections
take a narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy,
more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings
around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the
private system. The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It
cannot reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which
are found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more powerful
influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so formed by nature
that, upon the appearance of certain characters, dispositions, and actions,
it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame; nor are there
any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters
which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace
and security of human society; as the characters which excite blame are
chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance: whence it may
reasonably be presumed, that the moral sentiments arise, either mediately
or immediately, from a reflection of these opposite interests. What though
philosophical meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture;
that everything is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities,
which disturb society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable
to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote
its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able
to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate
view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he
find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections?
Why then should his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible
with them? Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between
vice and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy,
as well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity?
Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the
human mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by
any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever. The second objection
admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer; nor is it possible
to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the
actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These
are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to
handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved
in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which
she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference
and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute
decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been
found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be
thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries;
and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with
suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common
life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries,
without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and
contradiction! [1] The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted
for, from another cause, viz. a false sensation of seeming experience which
we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions.
The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly
speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being,
who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination
of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding
objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want
of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we
feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of
any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting on
human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are
commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives,
and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that,
in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like
it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this
has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human
liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most occasions;
and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because,
when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves easily
every way, and produces an image of itself (or a Velleity, as it is called
in the schools) even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image,
or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been
compleated into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find,
upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the
fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the motive of our actions.
And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within
ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives
and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that
he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation
and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition.
Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.
[2] Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any thing, it is easy
to observe, that producing is synonymous to causing. In like manner, if
a cause be defined, that by which any thing exists, this is liable to the
same objection. For what is meant by these words, by which? Had it been
said, that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists; we
should have understood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the
matter. And this constantly forms the very essence of necessity, nor
have we any other idea of it.