Rachels Chapt.3
Subjectivism in Ethics

The Basic Idea of Subjectivism

•  a theory about the nature of moral judgments
• even more radical form of relativism than cultural relativism: moral values are relative to individuals
• no right and wrong per se
• b. just right-for-Sally, wrong-for-Sue, etc.

Evolution of the Theory: how theories develop

• criticisms are made or objections are seen to arise
• the theory gets modified to try to meet these difficulties

The First Stage: Simple Subjectivism

• The doctrine
• "X is good [or right]" means "I (the speaker) approve of X"
• "X is bad [or wrong]" means "I (the speaker) disapprove of X"
• First Objection: a reductio
• If SS were correct none of us could be wrong in our moral judgments
• wrong means I dissaprove
• if I disapprove of something be saying [sincerely] "It's wrong"
• then I do disapprove
• How could I be mistaken
• But we can be wrong
• So SS is false
• Second Reductio
• If SS were true there could be no moral disagreements
• If Singer says "Infanticide is sometimes, o.k." that means "Singer approves of infanticide under some circumstances"
• If you say "it's alwas wrong" that means "You disapprove of infanticide under all circumstances."
• But "that Singer disapproves" and "that you approve" are both true!
• There's no contradiction in between them; they're not logically opposed
• But we think the moral judgments are logically opposed: compare
• "Infanticide is always wrong" v.
• "Infanticide isn't always wrong"
• Singer says its right in certain cases and you say it's not under any circumstances;
• So Singer might say -- I hear you You disapprove and I approve. Jolly good.
• Compare: "You like broccoli and I don't." Jolly good.
• Morality would be one big nonjudgmental encounter session.
• We really do disagree.
•  Morality ain't like one big encounter session.
• {Possible subjectivist rejoinder?  Maybe it ain't but it should be! (LH)}
• So SS is false.

The Second Stage: Emotivism

• Begins with the observation that language is used in a variety of ways
• not only to state facts: indicative statements
• but also to ask questions (interrogative sentences); expresss feelings (exclamations)
• and [of especial interest here] to give commands (imperative sentences)
• Emotivist Thesis: moral judgments -- though they have the surface grammar of statements, are really disguised commands.
• Surface grammar: when I say X is right" I seem to be saying there is a property (rightness) had by X.
• Depth grammar
• What I am really saying is "Do X"
• When I say X is wrong I'm saying "Don't do X"
• So we really do disagree -- in attitude if not opinion.
• Rachel's Rejoinder
• Commands don't require backing by reasons -- force & irrational means of persuasion do fine, thanks
• But morality is not like that: moral judgments do have to be backed by reasons
• So moral discourse is fact stating
• not just disguised command giving
• there are normative (moral) facts

Rachels' Counterproposal

• there are moral facts
• it's a false dichotomy to think
• Either there are moral facts in the same way there are facts about stars and planets
• Or else "values" are nothing more than the expression of subjective feelings.
• people have not only feelings but reason.
• "Moral truths are truths of reason; that is, a moral judgment is true if it is backed by better reasons than the alternatives." (Rachels' vague Kantian hope)
• LH's QUESTION: What does "better" mean here?
• "Logically better" will not get us far
• "Reason says what it says regardless of our opinions or desires" (p. 40)
• But it doesn't say much: any consistent morality will pass muster
• compare science
• logic tells us IF the moon is green cheese and all green cheese is edible, then the moon is edible.
• but observation is required -- factual input -- to determine whether the moon IS green cheese.
• but "morally better" (what we need to criticize the values premises) is circular.
• BJD: better reasons to operate than not?
• sanctity of life v. quality of life (pursuit of happiness)
• life in and of itself is good
• happiness in and of itself is good
• sanctity of live vs. accursedness of life
• life in and of itself is bad
• happiness in and of itself is bad
• General (Humean) principle: intrinsic value cannot be inferred but must be perceived
• only instrumental value (as means) can be inferred: practical syllogism
• M is valuable as means
• to some further end I
• I is valuable as means to some further end E
• but E . . . eventually . . . must be given as valuable in and of itself
• by "moral sentiment" (Hume)
• nature-given & nurture-given desire (Aristotle)
• givenness of intrinsic value: two takes
• relativist: moral self-legislation: desire is constitutive of value
• things are intrinsically good because we (tend to) seek them.
• desire is good-making (value is "in the eye of the beholder")
• absolutist: we seek these things because they're good: moral perception
• we desire them because of their goodness
• desire is good-sensing not good-making

The Example of Homosexuality

• No doubt that many people's anti-homosexual beliefs are rooted in irrational fears & hatreds
• LH: Still, they have (or at least give) reasons, e.g.:
1. It is morally wrong to do what God forbids.
2. God forbids homosexual practices.
3. Therefore: It's morally wrong to engage in homosexual practices.
• Nothing glaringly irrational here
• Maybe glaringly unkind in the light of facts Rachels cites about
• the involuntary nature of sexual orientation
• the centrality of sexual self-expression to most peoples' pursuit of happiness
• that attitude of unkindness itself
• may be rooted in the fears & hatreds mentioned
• and fuel a kind of unthinking acceptance of these premises
• But moral condemnation of homosexuality is perfectly rational
• on  these premises
• if you have that attitude.
• attitude itself
• may be held for irrational reasons or have nonrational causes
• but it's not inherently irrational (e.g., not self-contradictory)
• reprehensible =/=> irrational
• Rachels conclusion
• moral thinking and moral conduct are a matter of weighing reasons and being guided by them
• in focussing on attitudes and feelings, Ethical Subjectivism seems to be going in the wrong direction
• LH's conclusion
• the reasoning moral thinking & conduct involves requires weighing
• normative principles based  (metaphysically or epistemically) on attitudes and feelings
• in focussing on attitudes and feelings, Ethical Subjectivism seems to be going in the right direction