Rachels Chapter 5
Psychological Egoism

Is Unselfishness Possible

• Morality tells us what we ought to do
• ought implies can
• morality tells us to be unselfish
• so if we can't be unselfish, morality -- at least on this point -- is bunk.
• According to psychological egoism everyone always acts selfishly
• all we do is in pursuit of our own interests
• therefore it is absurd to command people to act altruistically

The Strategy of retinterpting motives

• Take any prima-facie case of a seemingly altruistic act
• seeming not motivated by self-interest
• seemingly motivated by concern for the interests of others
• Can always interpret the agents real motive as self-interested
• suppose you dive into freezing water to save a drowning child
• yes it was cold & dangerous
• but nevertheless we can find selfish motives behind it
• it gave you satisfaction -- made you feel heroic
• enabled you to avoid unpleasant guilt-feelings you might have had if you hadn't tried
• you did it in order to produce such good feelings and avoid those bad ones in yourself, i.e., for selfish reasons.

Two Arguments in Favor of Psychological Egoism

1. In all cases -- whether acting "selfishly or unselfishly" a person is merely doing what they most want to do -- i.e. acting from their own desires in accordance with their own interests.
• First Objection: I don't much like
• people don't always do what they most want
• cases of instrumentally desirable aims not desired in themselves not decisive
• unpleasant means: undertake these unpleasantries -- which we don't desire to undergo (e.g., danger and cold)
• to pleasant ends: for the sake of something we do desire (e.g., feeling heroic & guilt free).
• but it's also possible to act purely from moral obligation -- contrary to every desire of yours -- just because you see that it's your moral duty to do so.
• not because all out or all things considered, we want to
• but just because we believe we ought
• What I don't much like:
• believing you ought to X doesn't suffice for doing X
• shown by the phenomenon of "incontinence" or "weakness of will"
• "For I do not do the good I would"
• "but the evil I would not is what I do." (Romans 7:20)
• you also have to want -- all out, or all things considered -- to do what you ought
• if you did it because you believed you ought
• if you believed you ought & didn't do it
• then to do what you ought
• wasn't what you wanted all out, or all things considered
• Second Objection: I think decisive
• Distinguish between the subject and the object of wants
• Compare
1. I want to eat the whole cake myself.
2. I want you to have a piece of cake.
• Distinction Applied
• I am the subject -- the wanter in both cases
• Nevertheless the object differs
• That I should do or have something in the first case.
• That you should do or have something in the second
• Upshot Analysis
• we always do what we most want
• but what we want doesn't always pertain to ourselves
• when it does: that's self-interested
• innocently so: if the pursuit is not detrimental to others
• selfishly so: if it is detrimental to others
• when it doesn't: that's altruisitic
2. It's really the feeling of self-satisfaction (or non-guilt) in yourself that's the object of your desire.  (Applies the strategy of reinterpreting motives).
• Finding satisfaction in helping others (e.g.) is not what we call selfish but unselfish
• Clear counterexample: My desire that my son should survive me.
• I don't just desire the satisfaction I would get from thinking he'll survive me
• if you tell me he's living happily in Australia when in fact he's dead
• I'll get that pleasure of thinking he's alive and well and probably going to outlive me
• but it will be a hoax -- my desire is really not satisfied
• I'm not seeking pleasure from the actual fulfilment since, when that happens, I'm dead
• Priority of desire argument -- the self-satisfaction line rests on a mistaken view of the relation between desire and pleasure (Aristotle).
• we don't desire things or experiences because of the feeling of pleasure they give
• rather we take pleasure or derive satisfaction from them things or experiences because we desire them

Clearing Away Some Confusions

1. selfishness <> self-interest
• going to the Doctor when I'm ill is in my interest
• but not necessarily selfish
2. self-interest <> the pursuit of pleasure
• pursuit of some pleasures is not in our best interests
• pleasures of tobacco smoking
• pleasures of illicit sex
3. concern for one's own welfare not incompatible with concern for others

The Deepest Objection: Untestability

• On its face PE is admirable in its theorecal simplicity
• Much we do is motivated by self-interest
• It would be an admirable theortical coup
• if we could explain all behavior as deriving from a single motive
• like Newton explaining celestial and terrestrial motion on the same principles
• Trouble is -- on the face of things -- we appear to have many different motives
• greed, anger, lust, love, hate, revenge, curiosity . . . to name a few
• suppose I do something apparently self-destructive (not in my enlightened self-interest) out of revenge it appears
• PE will reinterpret my deed as really aiming at some feeling of satisfaction I think to derive from taking revenge (or whatever)
• suppose I'm totally cold blooded -- I don't get mad I just get even
• PE will not be dissuaded by my failure to report feeling of satisfaction -- will posit them anyway
• The reinterpretive strategy makes the self-interest unfalsifiable and hence
• empirically empty & scientifically bankrupt
• compare: invisible trains
• you could hear them coming
• ah, I say, they're also inaudible
• you could feel them coming

ah, I say, they're also intangible (+ unscented & flavorless . . . I hasten to add)