Ethical Egoism

Is There a Duty to Contribute to Famine Relief?

• Commonly assumed that we have duties to help others when we can & refrain from hurting others when we can
• Ethical Egoism Denies this: Holds we ought to pursue our own self-interests exclusively
• of course you should still help others when its in your interest to do so
• and you should avoid hurting others when it in your best interest not to hurt them
• and it often is in your interests to help or avoid hurting others since it makes them more likely to help & avoid hurting you
• also pursuing your own enlightened long term interests is what's meant
• says it's good to be selfish
• but not that it's good to be foolish
• Observation: EE and PE -- though often espoused together (e.g., by Hobbes) actually seem incompatible
• Would-be argument? (LH)
1. Ought implies can.
2. People can't be unselfish, or altruisitc. {PE: Corollary}
3. Therefore, it's not the case that people ought to be altruisitc. {1,2}
4. Therefore, people ought to be nonaltruisitic, i.e., they ought to pursue their own intersest exclusively (EE). {3}
• Critique of the would-be argument
• 4 doesn't follow from 3: "not ought" does not entail "ought not"
• Example: permissible non-obligatory acts
• Not the case that I morally ought to pull on my pants left leg first
• Not the case that I morally ought not to pull my pants on left leg first, either.
• Either is morally permissible.
• Diagnosis
• Ought to X and "ought not to X are related as contraries:
• can't both be true
• can both be false
• not as contradictorises:
• if one is true the other must be false & vice versa
• Counterargument
1. People can't not pursue their own interests exclusively.  {PE: a corollary}
2. Ought implies can not.
• as absurd to morally require people to do what they can't not do as what they can't do.
• examples
• we're not morally obliged to obey the law of gravity (we can't not).
• we're not morally obliged to occupy only one place at a time (we can't not).
• not morally obliged to not to exceed the speed of light (we can't not)
3. People aren't morally obligated to pursue their own interests exclusively (not EE). {1,2}
• Discussion
• impossible & necessary behavior or conditions are neither obligatory nor forbidden
• they're neutral or beyond the pale or
• outside the bailiwick of morality = "things within our power to do or not" (Aristotle)

Three Arguments for EE

• The individual is more likely to contribute to social betterment by pursuing their own interests
• supporting considerations
• each knows their own wants & needs best
• looking out for others is unwarranted intrusion on their privacy
• charity degrades the recipient
• Criticisms
• quarrels with the supporting considerations
• sometimes mother knows best
• helping not always = butting in
• charity doesn't always degrade the recipient
• Is it really degrading to be given food when you're hungry?
• More degrading than being allowed to starve?
• More serious defect: not really an argument for ethical egoisim at all
• ethical egoism endorsed not as end in itself, here
• but as means to social betterment
• so social betterment is the end in which value truly resides
• The Ayn Rand Argument
• the argument
1. We each ought to regard this one life as of supreme importance or ultimate value to us.
• since we each have just one life.
2. ethical egoism and only ethical egoism allows each individual's life to be of supreme importance or ultimate value to them
• other moral theories all directly or indirectly enjoin altruism
• altruism regards the individual life as something one may be required to sacrifice for the sake of others
• so, altruism does not allow each individuals life to be of supreme importance to them
3. Therefore, we all ought to be Ethical Egoists.
• Rachels' criticism: the argument: rests on a false dichotomy (I don't really see).
• How Rachels sees the argument
• EE or Radical Altruism (RA = regarding your life as of NO importance)
• Not RA
• Therefore,EE.
• Rachels rejoinder
• altruism doesn't demand regarding your life as of NO importance
• due concern for oneself doesn't require regarding one's self as the ONLY important thing
• there is a middle ground: "the common-sense view"
• sometimes you should look out for the interests of others
• sometimes you should look out for number one
• LH's Criticism: the argument is circular or "begs the question"
• 1 just is Ethical Egoism
• All comes down to the "one life to live" argument for 1
• quibble: the "one life to live" premise is dubious
• more serious objection: even if true, it doesn't entail 1
• might equally well conclude -- given one life
• it'd be a shame to waste it in self-indulgence and self-aggrandizement:
• that one should strive for lasting things & find value in larger causes, e.g.,
  As for man, his days are like grass; he flousishes like a flower of the field; for the wind passes over it and it is gone; and its place knows it no more.  But the steadfast love of the LORD is from everlasting to everlasting upon those who fear him, and his righteousness to children's children, to those who keep his covenant and remember his commandments.  (Psalm 103:15-18)
• The Non-Revisionist argument; Egoism provides rational basis for altruism.
• Hobbes: we should do good unto others because if we do others will be more likely to do good unto us
• using others well is the best way to insure we'll be used well
• so altruism is justified by being in the best interests of each individual
• Two Objections:
• doesn't show that altruistic concern is always warranted
• if I know I can get away with murder (if I know I won't be found out and punished or subject to revenge)
• then, on this view I should do it.
• reminiscent of people who apologize for getting caught!
• Proves less than it tries to:
• even if altruism is in my elighened best interest
• there may be other reasons why it's good
• may be both instrumentally good vis a vis my own self interest
• and intrinsically good
• good in and of itself
• contrary to egoism

Three Arguments Against EE

• Kurt Baier's Argument
• the argument
1. morality is supposed to help us resolve conflicts of interest
2. EE gives no help in this regard
3. So EE is not an acceptable morality
• pro EE rejoinder: 1 is false: morality shouldn't try to adjudicate moral disputes
• disputes are resolved by someone winning out or by compromise between the warring parties
• not by appeal to some supposedly impartial standards
• The self-contradictory argument:
• the argument:
1. Assuming EE . . . people will often have conflicting duties
• example
• it's in B's best-interest to kill K: so B has a duty to do so (according to EE)
• and it's in K's best interest to avoid being killed: K has a duty (by EE) to prevent it
2. It's wrong to prevent someone's doing their duty
3. So EE entails a contradiction
• it's not wrong for B to kill K (since it's in B's best-interest to kill K)
• it is wrong for B to kill K
• K has a duty to avoid being killed
• and it's wrong for B to prevent K from doing K's duty
4. So EE is false.
• rejoinder
• the contradiction doesn't derive from EE alone
• it derives from EE plus premise 2: "It's wrong to prevent someone from doing their duty."
• Friends of EE will reject this premise
• it's only wrong (according to EE) to prevent someone from doing their duty if it's a contrary to you interests to prevent it
• here it plainly is in K's interest to prevent B from doing his duty
• so K is not wrong -- in fact K is morally obliged (by EE) -- to do so
• Rachels' Argument
• the argument
1. We can justify treating people differently only if we can show that there is some factual difference between them that is relevant to justifying the diffference in treatment.
2. Ethical egoism says we should treat others and ourselves differently
3. But there is no factual difference between self and others that justifies this difference in treatment
4. So EE is unacceptably arbitrary
• Rachels' comments on this argument
• sheds light on why we should care about others interests
• for the very same reason we care about our own
• because they are in all relevant respects like us
• LH's comments: it's sneaky question begging (a wolf in sheeps clothing)
• 1 makes substantive appeal to minimim conception's impartiality requirement (the wolf)
• friends of EE will most emphatically reject this
• it's directly contrary to EE
• EE says you should be partial
• R's definition of "moral" theory as requiring impartiality presented initially as a wholly terminological matter (the sheep's clothing)
• capturing the descriptive force of "moral" as in "she faced a moral dilemma"
• without prejuding the prescriptive or evaluative question: should we act in a "moral" style
• on reasons
• that are impartial
• EE is not a "moral" theory (on this definition): it's not impartial
• Take your fusty old word "morality" EE might reply
• I'm saying that, in the final analysis, EE-ishly is how you ought to live.
• If that's not "moral" as you define it . .. so much the worse for your definition.
• If acting "moral" =df acting in some distinct positively characterized manner
• Then acting "moral" <>df doing what you Ought or what's Right or what's Best
• Then whether acting in a moral manner is Best is an open question