The Debate Over Utilitarianism
The Resiliance of the Theory
Classical Utilitarianism
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Actions are judged right or wrong solely on the basis of their consequences
(not by whether it accords or fails to accord with rules).
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in assessing consequences the only thing that counts is happiness
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Truly Classic: hedonistic: happiness = pleasure minus pain (Bentham)
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in calculating the happiness vs unhappiness that will result all affected
parites count equally:
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"Each counts one
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none counts more than one."
Widespread Acceptance
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Faced with serious difficulties
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Tendency has been to try to modify the theory to meet these difficulties
rather than to entirely give up on it: to accept in on the basis of an
inference to the best justification:
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A theory is needed.
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No theory is perfect.
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Despite its problems Utilitarianism is still the best theory going.
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Competing theories are all less useful
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and no less problematic.
What is Happiness? (Is Pleasure the Only Thing that Matters?)
Happiness & Hedonism
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"The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only
thing desirable, as an end; all other things being desirable as means to
that end." (J. S. Mill: quoted by Rachels, p. 103)
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Bentham identified happiness with pleasure and unhappiness with pain.
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Bentham was a hedonist: held the only intrinsically good thing is pleasure
(n.b. contra Rachels)
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Rachels says "The view that happiness is the one ultimate good . . . is
know as Hedonism"
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Not in this class!
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The view that happiness is the one ultimate good is eudaemonism.
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Bentham is both.
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Mill not so hedonistic
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hedonism vulnerable to accusations of vulgarity
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overvaluation of the beastly pleasures of sex and breeding due to their
intensity
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undervaluation of more refined satisfactions due to their subtlety
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that job well done feeling
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civilized satisfactions of artistic creation & appreciation
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Mill: recognized qualitative differences between pleasures besides
the quantitative differences of intensity & duration as morally important.
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Pushkin-pleasure is inherently better than pushpin pleasure.
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The civilized satisfactions of tennis (e.g.) really are superior
to the primitive tingles of sex.
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Mill's view: Happiness a kind of la-la-la-la-feeling-groovy feeling?
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Aristotle: Is happiness a feeling?
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eu-daemonia (good spirited): blessed/fortunate v. cheery-n-upbeat
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which comes first?
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was the outcome of my accident happy because it put me in good spirits?
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or am I in good spirits because my accident had a happy (fortunate)
outcome?
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happiness in the first place is a kind of comprehensive overall goodness
of life . . . the quality of the life itself (not some kind of feeling).
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also contrary to Mill: Happiness is not the only intrinsic good -- though
it is the highest good.
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many intrinsically good things: desirable in and of themselves
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artistry,
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knowledge,
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love
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& pleasure
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but also desirable for the sake of happiness: a happy life including all
of the above & more in due proportion.
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No one kind of feeling = the one and only intrinsic good
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nor 2, nor 3, for that matter
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two reasons
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doesn't do justice to the variety of human aims and satisfactions
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many pleasing or satisfying things have very refined feelings attached.
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Perhaps none at all
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I was pleased that my overheads were still in my briefcase when I opened
it.
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Was there a distinct pleasurable feeling I had?
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I'm dubious.
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gets the satisfaction desire relation backwards
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It's because we desire friends, knowledge, beauty, and things
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that getting these things makes us feel happy
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not vice versa: as if there is some quantity (that obscure tingle
of satisfaction) that we really desire in desiring all good things
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Any view that identifies the intrinsic good with some kind of feeling is
guilty on these two counts.
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Hedonism: the view that happiness = pleasure.
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Millian Eudaemonism: the view that happiness = feeling-groovy
Contemporary Utilitiarism
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Speaks of preference or "interest" (Singer) satisfaction: putting the horse
before the cart.
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What's best is what maximizes preference satisfaction among all affected
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preferences just pro-attitudes or inclinations of whatever sort
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not just desires for sex food, etc. whose satisfaction brings sensual pleasure
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but also more refined inclinations -- carrying their own, nonsensual, satisfactions
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or whatever: just plain wierdness: my desire for an autographed photo of
Elvis
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each counts one, none more than one, and each decides their own preferences
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Nice ain't it?
Are Consequences All That Matter?
What of Justice?
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Scenario 1: A black man is reported to have raped & murdered white
woman.
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Moral crossroads:
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Plan A: We prevent lynching & rioting by picking out some innocent
black man and framing him.
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Plan B: We don't do this knowing that there will very probably be a race
riot.
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with lynchings, beatings, burnings
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with the loss of many lives and much property
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Plausible upshot of utilitarian calculation:
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Plan A: the answer is obvious: one life vs. many
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We're morally obliged -- it'd be wrong not to -- frame this innocent man.
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This seems strongly contrary to our moral intuitions: It's unjust!
What about Rights?
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Scenario 2: An actual case in Chino, C
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under false pretenses officer Ron Story induced a woman, Angelynne York,
to be photographed while naked, assuming various indecent poses
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photos were passed around among the guys down at the station.
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she found out & sued & won.
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Did officer Story do wrong?
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Utilitarian answer: only if the woman's mortification outweighed the pleasure
the officers got from ogling the photos: possibly it did.
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If so Utilitarianism gives the right answer.
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But there's something amiss with their reasoning.
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Consider Scenario 2a: The woman never finds out.
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there's the mirth and enjoyment of the guys down at the precinct,
on the one hand
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no countervailing consternation, shame & chagrin on the other (Ms.
York wouldn't know)
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So it seems on balance -- according to a Utilitarian calculation -- that
the police were right to do this.
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an obligation even!
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and in the real case . . . perhaps they just should've been more careful
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Consider Scenario 2b: What they really should have done!
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put up the pictures on the internet
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so that millions of men can ogle them
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no doubt that Ms. York will find this even more mortifying . . . but how
mortified can one person get?
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it's millions to one!
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This seems strongly contrary to our moral intuitions: It violates
the woman's rights!
Diagnosis of the Source of these difficulties
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Utilitarianism is forward looking: only consequences matter
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But often the past matters at well, it seems
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it's relevant in the first case that the guy didn't do it
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relevant in the second case that the pictures were deceitfully obtained
and distributed without the womans knowledge or consent
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that is was without he knowledge not a mitigating factor!
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quite the contrary
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Raising seperate issues?
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the ill-gotten enjoyment of the guys down at the station house not a mitigating
factor.
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more inadvertantly ill-gotten would-be enjoyment of guys on the internet
not mitigating either
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quite the contrary!
The Defense of Utilitarianism
First line: point up the flaws in the calculations in the examples
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Scenario 1: forgot to figure in considerable probability people would find
out we'd framed an innocent man
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trust in the law would be undermined
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with worse overall consequences, in the long run, than the envisaged riots
& lynchings
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Scenario 2: in reality the woman did find out
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and was mortified
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with the lawsuit & attendant publicity
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actually resulting in loss of respect for law enforcement
Second line: Rule Utilitarianism
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Problem with the first line
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though plausible that in most cases like these the truth will out &
bad consequences follow
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surely not always
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in these exceptional cases, utilitarianism still delivers the wrong verdicts
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Modification of the theory: do what as a rule would have
the most desirable and the least undersirable consequences. Solves
the exceptional case problem.
Third line: "So what?" (biting the bullet)
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Sometimes utilitarism tells us things contrary to our moral intuitions
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So does chemistry tell us things contrary to our observational intuitions
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that rusting is a form of combustion
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that glass is a liquid
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That's what theories do
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in the process or systematizing our observations/intuitions
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they run counter to certain recalcitrant observations/intuitions
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in which case the most reasonable thing to do
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is sometimes to modify (or reject) the theory
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and sometimes to reeducate or even reject the recalcitrant intuitions.
What is Correct and Incorrect in Utilitarianism
What's Correct
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Consequences matter: the happiness or unhappiness that result from our
actions is a morally relevant consideration
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The emphasis on impartiality must be central to any viable morality
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Moral intutions about cases are not infallible
What's Incorrect
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Consequences are not all that matter
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Considerations of rights and justice matter in ways the utilitarian can't
account for
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question of individual desert & responsibility
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the man an woman in our counterexamples didn't deserve the treatment they
got.
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Even if Rule-Utilitarian gets the right results it gets them for the wrong
reasons
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not just because -- as a rule -- such acts have bad consequences
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it's because they're unfair -- the victims didn't deserve
their mistreatment
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because of "backward-looking" considerations RU still leaves out