Are There Absolute Moral Rules?
Kant and the Categorical Imperative
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Overview
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Rule based: more like traditional conception
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deontological: oughts or commands the basis of morality
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the character of the act itself -- not consequences -- what matters
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the character of the act itself determined by its maxim (see below)
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terminological shift
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consequentialist talk: "good", "bad", "value"
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deontological talk: "right", "wrong", "duty"
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rules come from reason itself
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Practical syllogism revisited: Inquiring Murderer Case
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It's wrong to tell a lie. (Reason says)
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If I misinformed the hit man looking for you about your whereabouts, that
be a lie.
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So I ought not to misinform the hit man about your whereabouts.
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Reason alone is the source of (knowledge of) moral duty
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not God
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not society
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not an individual's "moral sentiments" or feelings
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too varied (different strokes counterexamples in chap. 10)
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dreaded heteronymy of the will
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Categorical Imperative: an imperative of reason itself
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A rule for making other rules Kant calls maxims.
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Based on the Golden rule
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Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
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GR also prone to different strokes troubles:
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other folks might not want to be done unto as you would
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a source of imposition (especially by do-gooders).
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e.g., the temperance crusader thinks, something like:
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"I pray that someone would save me from demon rum if I drank."
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Therefore, I should strive to take it away from everyone.
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if reformed:
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"I wish someone had kept demon rum from me when I used to
drink."
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Hypothetical vs Categorical Imperatives
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hypothetical "oughts"
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if you want to gamble you ought to go to Vegas (or Mt.Pleasant)
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if you want to pass the course you ought to complete the assignments
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if you want to get yourself hassled try giving the next policeman you see
the finger
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categorical imperatives -- no "ifs" -- you ought to do it period.
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morality concerns how we ought to live and act
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all things considered, or in the final analysis: no ifs,
ands, or buts
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Kantian take: "regardless of your particular wants and desires"
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Kant: Categorical Imperatives are binding on all rational agents
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derive from a principle every rational agent must accept
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not just personal preference
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not sensibility: that's heteronymy of the will
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The Categorical Imperative: Act only according to that maxim by which
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
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Consider what maxim you would be acting under it you did that.
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Test the maxim for universalizability
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Would you willing to have everyone act on that maxim?
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Mom: "What if everyone did that?"
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Crucial case: role reversal (if you were the patient)
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Mom: "How would you like it if your brother did that to you?"
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Make a Moral Judgment
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Maxim passes: the action is morally premissable -- you may morally act
on it
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Maxim fails: the action is morally wrong: your moral duty forbids doing
this
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Examples
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payment of a bet
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If I don't repay I act on the maxim "Don't bother to pay your bets."
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If everyone did this:
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The practice of betting would be undermined, which I don't wish.
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Reversal: If I were in his shoes I'd wish to be repaid.
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So I shouldn't welsh on my bet.
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being charitable
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If I don't give of myself charitably I'm acting on the maxim "Don't bother
to help others in need."
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If everyone did this:
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The practice of charity would be undermined, which I don't wish.
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Reversal: If I were in need, I'd wish for charity.
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So, I should give of myself charitably.
Absolute Rules and the Duty not to Lie
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The maxim "it is premissable to lie" would be self-defeating
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no one would believe anyone
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no one would believe your lies
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communication itself -- the very possibility of lying -- would be destroyed
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Anscombe's rejoinder: why does it have to be this maxim.
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case of the inquiring murderer shows its nonuniversalizability!
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a different maxim might better be universalizable
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e.g.: It's permissable to lie when doing so would save someone's life.
Conflicts Between Rules
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If there is more than one would-be absolute moral rule
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conflicts will arise: e.g., the Euthyphro case (or the euthanasia case)
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between honoring your father, say
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and "thou shalt not kill"
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if two rules can ever come into conflict, they can't both be absolute
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we have to do something
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doing nothing is something
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and a wrong thing
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whatever it is will break one of the rules
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Real case: The Dutch fishermen smuggling Jewish refugees out of Nazi territory
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the conflicting rules
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don't lie
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don't let innocent people be killed
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had to do one or the other
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so both rules couldn't be absolute
Another Look at Kant's Basic Idea
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Moral judgements must be backed by consistent (impartially applicable)
reasons.
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binding on all persons
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at all times
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a requirement of consistency that "no rational person could deny" (Rachels:
126)
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Key implications
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a person cannot regard themselves as special from a moral point of view
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there are purely rational contraints on what we morally may do
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I cannot consistently drink your beer
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Unless I'm also willing to have you drink mine.
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This doesn't require absolute rules (Rachels)
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All that's required:
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"when we break a rule"
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it must be "for a reason that we would be willing for anyone to accept,
if they were in our position."
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Solves the worry about the inquiring murderer
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Kant on the Case of the Inquiring Murderer
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After you have honestly answered the murderer's question as to whether
his intended victim is at home, it may be that he has slipped out so that
he does not come in the way of the murderer, and thus that the murder may
not be committed. But if you had lied and said he was not at home
when he had really gone out without you knowing it, and if the murderer
had met him as he went away and murdered him, you might justly be accused
as the cause of his death. For if you had told the truth as far as
you knew it, perhaps the murderer might have been apprehended byt the neighbors
while he searched the house and thus the deed might have been prevented.
Therefore, whoever tells a lie, however well intentioned he might be, must
answer for the consequences, however unforseeable they were, and pay the
penalty for them. . . .
To be truthful (honest) in all
deliberations, therefore, is a sacred and absolutely commanding decree
of the reason. ("On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives": in
Rachels, p. 122)
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Comments (LH)
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Shows Kant's dismissal of the moral importance of consequences.
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"The only absolutely good thing is a good will."