Final Review Sheet
Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us
intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the
But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain
relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, as
because in no other way can an object be given to us.
That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a
form cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all
appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready
the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being
apart from all sensation.
[T]here are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles
of a priori knowledge, namely, space and time.
By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to
objects as outside us, and all without exception in space.
Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner
yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there
nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the
of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner
is therefore represented in relations of time. Time cannot be outwardly
intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us.
Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is
the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer
is possible for us.
The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known,
cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no
is ever asked in regard to it.
Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any
For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our
if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a
Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition
of ourselves and of our inner state.
Everything that is represented through a sense is so far always
and consequently we must either refuse to admit that there is an inner
sense, or we must recognize that the subject, which is the object of
sense, can be represented through it only as appearance, not as that
would judge of itself if its intuition were self-activity only,
is, were intellectual.
[T]he mind, since it then intuits itself not as it would represent
if immediately self-active, but as it is affected by itself, and
as it appears to itself, not as it is.
So far, too, are the students of metaphysics from exhibiting any kind
unanimity in their contentions, that metaphysics has rather to be
as a battleground quite peculiarly suited for those who desire to
themselves in mock combats, and in which no participant has ever yet
in gaining even so much as an inch of territory, not at least in such
as to secure him in its permanent possession. This shows, beyond all
that the procedure of metaphysics has hitherto been a merely random
and, what is worst of all, a groping among mere concepts.
[T]he new point of view enables us to explain how there can be
a priori; and, in addition, to furnish satisfactory proofs of the laws
which form the a priori basis of nature, regarded as the sum of the
of experience - neither achievement being possible on the procedure
[Reason] must approach nature in order to be taught by it. It
not, however, do so in the character of a pupil who listens to
that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge who compels
the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated.
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to
... We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success
the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that
should be possible to have knowledge of object a priori, determining
in regard to them prior to their being given.
If intuition must conform to the constitution of objects, I do not see
how we could know anything of the latter a priori; but if the object
object of the senses) must conform to the constitution of our faculty
intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.
[A priori] knowledge has only to do with the appearances, and must
the thing in itself as indeed real per se, but as not known by us. For
what necessarily forces us to transcend the limits of experience and of
all appearances is the unconditioned, which reason, by
and by right, demands in things in themselves, as required to complete
the series of conditions.
[N]othing in a priori knowledge can be assigned to objects save what
thinking subject derives from itself ...
[T]here is no contradiction [given that 'object' has both phenomenal
a noumenal senses] in supposing that one and the same will is, in the
that is, in its visible acts necessarily subject to the law of nature,
and so far not free, while yet, as belonging to a thing in itself, is
subject to that law and is therefore free. My soul, viewed from the
standpoint, cannot indeed be known by means of speculative reason (and
still less through empirical observation); and freedom as a property of
a being to which I attribute effects in the sensible world, is
also not knowable in such a fashion.
Thus it does indeed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of
is limited to mere objects of experience. But our further contention
also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these
as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think
as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd
that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
'Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept
of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is
the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God
is omnipotent', contains two concepts, each of which has its object -
and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but
serves to posit the predicate in relation to the subject.
Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot
These unavoidable problems set by pure reason itself are God, freedom,
Thus the critique of reason, in the end, necessarily leads to
knowledge; while its dogmatic employment, on the other hand, lands us
dogmatic assertions to which other assertions, equally specious, can
be opposed - that is, in skepticism.
Let us suppose that there is nothing antecedent to an event, upon which
it must follow according to rule. All succession of perception would
be only in the apprehension, that is, would be merely subjective, and
never enable us to determine objectively which perceptions are those
really precede and which are those that follow.
The experience of an event [ i.e. of anything as happening] is itself
only on this assumption [of an antecedent cause].
All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection
of cause and effect.
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without
no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty,
without concepts are blind.
Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions
the receptivity of impressions.
The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests,
on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through
alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a
to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can
any object whatsoever of experience be thought.
But a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in
this manner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in
of their subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of
experience, they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth
other than that of descent from experiences.
The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests,
on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through
alone does experience become possible.
It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my
for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be
at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would
be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.
For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition,
not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to
self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious
them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they
can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because
they would not all without exception belong to me.
Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given
in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the
identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these
Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This
knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations
to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the
of a given intuition is united.
Therefore the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of
representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly
Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an
in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition,
which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to
the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its
form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of
anything would be possible by means of ~. So far as I could know, there
would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be
[A]s yielding knowledge of things, [the categories] have no kind of
save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible
If ... we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are
affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means
of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by
in other wads, that, so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know
own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself.
I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself.
We cannot think an object save through categories; we cannot know an
so thought save through intuition corresponding to these concepts. Now
all our intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so far as the
is given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience.
can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience.
At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is
absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason - the moral -
in which in inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility.
[M]orality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as
a property of our will ... [since] it yields practical principles -
principles, proper to our reason - as a priori data of reason, and ...
this would be absolutely impossible save on the assumption of freedom
I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make
room for faith.
Nothing can be conceived in the world, a even out of it which can be
good, without qualification, except a good will.
[Having] deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it
obedience to any [particular] law, there remains nothing [as a basis
morality) but the universal conformity of the will’s actions to law in
general, which alone can serve as a principle, i.e., I am never to act
otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become
So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person a that of any
in every case as an end . . . never as a means only.
Autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every
Autonomy of the will is that property of it by which k is a law to
(independently of any property of the objects of volition).
[W]e ought to conform [to the moral law]; consequently we must be able
to do so.
Now as time past is no longer in my power, hence every action that I
must be a necessary result of certain determining grounds which are not
in my power, that is, at the moment in which I am acting I am never
Consequently, if we would save [freedom], no other way remains but to
that the existence of a thing, so far as it is determinable in time,
therefore its causality, according to the law of physical necessity,
to appearance, and to attribute freedom to the same being as a thing in
The summum bonum is possible in the world only on the
of a Supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character.
[I]t is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.
The summum bonum, then, is only possible on the supposition of
immortality of the soul; consequently, this immortality, being
connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason
Here we find contained the principal that Being is Thought.
In my view - a view which the developed exposition of the system itself
can alone justify - everything depends on grasping and expressing the
truth not as Substance but as Subject as well.
To pit this single assertion, that 'in the Absolute all is one,'
the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge, or of
which at least aims at and demands complete development - to give out
Absolute as the night in which, as we say, all cows are black - that is
the very naiveté of emptiness of knowledge.
Instead of making its way into the inherent content of the matter at
understanding always ... assumes a position above the particular
about which it is speaking. ... True scientific knowledge, on the
demands abandonment to the very life of the object ....
Spirit alone is Realty. It is the inner being of the world, that which
essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form,
and enters into relations with itself – it is eternality (others), and
exists for itself; yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it
is still one with itself - it is self contained and self-complete, in
and for itself at once.
True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of
into its own self in and from its other. ... It is the process of its
becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose, and has
its end as its beginning ....
To bring philosophy nearer to the form of science - that goal where it
can lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge -
is what I have set before me.
But this mere Being, as it is mere abstraction, is therefore the
negative, which, in a similarly immediate aspect, is just NOTHING.
The truth of Being and Nothing is accordingly the unity of the two: and
this unity is BECOMING.
The German spirit is the spirit of the new world. Its aim is the
of absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of freedom - that
freedom which has its own absolute from itself as its purport.
The family, as the immediate substantiality of mind, is specifically
by love, which is the mind's feeling of its own unity. Hence in a
ones state of mind is to have self-consciousness as one's individuality
within this unity as the absolute essence of oneself, with the result
one is in it not as an independent person but as a member.
The task of conducting this individual mind from its unscientific
to that of science had to be undertaken in its general sense; we had to
contemplate the formative development of the universal individual, of
spirit. As to the relation between these two [the particular and
individual] every moment as it gains a concrete form and its own proper
shape and appearance, finds a place in the life of the universal
The particular individual is an incomplete mind.
In like manner [to the birth of a child] the sprit of the time, growing
slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, disintegrates
one fragment after another of the structure of the previous world. ...
This gradual crumbling to pieces ... is interrupted by the sunrise,
in a flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and
of the new world.
Since in this independence [of the State] the being-for-self of real
has its existence, it is the first freedom and highest honor of a
War has the higher significance that through it the moral health of
is preserved in their indifference towards the stabilizing of finite
Philosophy must end in religion, because philosophy is thought, and
always involves finitude and opposition, e.g., the opposition of
and object, and of the mind that thinks to the matter that does not
Its business, therefore, is to show the finitude of all that is finite,
and through reason to demand its complement or completion in the
How very paltry and limited the normal human intellect is, and how
lucidity there is in the human consciousness, may be judged from the
that, despite the ephemeral brevity of human life the uncertainty of
existence and the countless enigmas which press upon us from all sides,
everyone does not continually and ceaselessly philosophize, but that
the rarest of exceptions do.
[Scientific discovery is] just like perception, an operation of the
an immediate intuition, and as such the work of an instant, an
a flash of insight.
'The world is my idea' is a truth valid for every living creature,
only man can consciously contemplate it. In doing so he attains
wisdom. No truth is more absolutely certain than that all that exists
knowledge, and, therefore, this whole world, is only object in relation
to subject, perception of a perceiver - in a word, idea. The world is
Thus, any single individual endowed with the faculty of perception of
object constitutes the whole world of idea as completely as the
in existence; but let this single individual vanish, and the whole
as idea would disappear. Each of these halves possess meaning and
only in and through the other, appearing with and vanishing with it.
the object begins the subject ends.
In one aspect, the world is idea; in the other aspect the world is will.
The body is given in two entirely different ways to the subject of
... It is given as an idea in intelligent perception. ... And it is
in quite a different way as that which is immediately known to every
and is signified by the word will.
The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different
objectively known, which the bond of causality unites; ... they are one
and the same, but they are given in different ways, - immediately, and
again in perception. ... The action of the body is nothing but the act
of will objectified, i.e. passed into perception. ... The whole body is
nothing but objectified will, i.e., will become idea.
We an surely never arrive at the nature of things from without. No
how assiduous our researches may be, we can never reach anything beyond
images and names.
Knowledge is completely subject to the will. ... Only through [its]
[to his body] is the object interesting to the individual, i.e.,
to his will. Therefore, the knowledge which is subject to the will
nothing further of objects than their relations.
If raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way
looking at things, gives up tracing their relations to each other, the
final goal of which is always a relation to his own will ... inasmuch
he loses himself in this object ... i.e., forgets even his
his will ... so that it is as if the object alone were there, without
to perceive it, ... in such perception the individual has lost
but he is pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.
Virtue is as little taught as is genius; indeed, the concept is just as
unfruitful for it as it is for art, and in the case of both can be used
only as an instrument. We should therefore be just as foolish to expect
that our moral systems and ethics would create virtuous, noble, and
men, as that our aesthetics would produce poets, painters, and
Common people certainly look like men; I have never seen any creatures
that resembled men so closely.
[The saint] no longer makes the egotistical distinction between his
and that of others, but takes as much interest in the sufferings of
individuals as in his own, and therefore is ... benevolent to the
degree ... [and] recognizes in all beings his own inmost and true self
Therefore, if a man fears death as his annihilation, it is just as if
were to think that the sun dies out at evening, “Woe is me! for I go
into eternal night. ... Life is assured to the will to live; the form
life is an endless present, no matter how individuals, the phenomena of
the Idea, arise and pass away in time, like fleeting dreams.
A saint may be full of the absurdest superstition, a, on the contrary,
he may be a philosopher, it is all the same. His conduct certifies that
he is a saint, for, in a moral regard, it proceeds from
of the world and its nature, which is not abstractly but intuitively
directly apprehended ....
To repeat the whole nature of the world abstractly, universally, and
in concepts, and thus to store up, as it were, a reflected image of it
in permanent concepts always at the command of the reason; this and
else is philosophy.
[T]he greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of
Moral good is good only on account of its tendency to secure physical
moral evil is evil only on account of its tendency to induce
[W]e must discover some calculus or process of moral arithmetic.
Every one to count for one and nobody to count for more than one.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign
Pain. To them ... we refer all our decisions, every resolve
we make in Life.
I am an adherent of the Principle of Utility when I measure my
or disapproval of any act, public or private, by its tendency to
pains and pleasures.
[Q]uantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry.
Now, if we examine the value of a pleasure, considered by itself and in
relation to a single individual, we shall find that it depends on four
circumstances: ( 1 ) its Intensity; (2) its Duration;
its Certainty, (4) its Proximity.
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those
rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand
of tyranny. ... The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can
but Can they suffer?
It is better to be a human being dissatisfied, than a pig satisfied;
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is
. . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
This then is the appropriate region of human liberty. I comprises,
the inward domain of consciousness; ... liberty of thought and feeling;
... of tastes and pursuits; ... of doing what we like ... without
from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them,
though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, a wrong.
We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a
false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.
[I]t is as certain that many opinions now general will be rejected by
ages, as it is that many, once general, are rejected by the present.
But much more of the meaning ... would have been understood, and what
understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if
man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con ....
Individuality is the same thing with development, and it is only the
of individuality which produces a can produce, well-developed human
[Drugs] may, however, be wanted not only for innocent but for useful
and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in
[F]ornication, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gambling;
should a person be free to be a pimp, a to keep a gambling house. ...
are arguments on both sides.
That the principle which regulates the existing social relations
the sexes - the legal subordination of one sex to the other - is wrong
itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and
it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting
power a privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.
I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by an uniform
of which the beginning is modifications of my body, the middle is
the end is outward demeanor. In the case of other human
I have the evidence of my senses for the first and last links of the
but not for the intermediate link ...by supposing the link to be of the
same nature as in the case of which I have experience, ...
I bring other human beings, as phenomena, under the same
which I know by experience to be the true theory of my own existence.
Now that the human mind has grasped celestial and terrestrial physics -
mechanical and chemical; organic physics, both vegetable and animal -
remains one science, to fill up the series of sciences of observation -
Social physics. This is what men have now most need of: and this it is
the principal aim of the present work to establish.
In the final, the positive state, the mind has given over the vain
after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the universe, and
the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to the study of their laws
- that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance.
and observation, duly combined, are the means of this knowledge. What
now understood when we speak of an explanation of facts is simply the
of a connection between single phenomena and some general facts, the
of which continually diminishes with the progress of science.
From the study of the development of human intelligence, in all
and through all times, the discovery arises of a great fundamental law
to which it is necessarily subject, and which has a solid foundation of
proof, both in the facts of our organization and in our historical
The law is this: that each of our leading conceptions - each branch of
our knowledge - passes successively through three different theoretical
conditions: the theological, a fictitious; the metaphysical, or
and the scientific, or positive.
Can it be supposed that the most important and the most delicate
and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small
of highly-prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary
and variable decisions of the least competent minds.
From political economy itself we have shown that the worker sinks to
level of a commodity, and to a most miserable commodity; that the
of the worker increases with the power and volume of his production;
the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a
few hands; and thus a restoration of monopoly in its most terrible
and finally that the distinction between capitalist and landlord, and
agricultural and factory worker, must disappear, and the whole of
divide into the two classes of property owners and propertyless workers.
What is embodied in the product of his labor is no longer his own. The
greater this product is, therefore, the more he is diminished. The
of the worker in his product means not only that it becomes an object,
assumes an external existence, but that it stands opposed to him as an
autonomous power. The life which he has given to the object sets itself
against him as an alien and hostile face.
Finally the external character of the work for the worker is shown by
fact that it is not his own work but work for someone else, that in
he does not belong to himself but to another person.
[T]he appropriation of unpaid labor is the basis of the Capitalist mode
of production, and of the exploitation of the worker that occurs under
it; even if the capitalist buys the labor power of his laborer at its
value as a commodity on the market he extracts more value from it than
he paid for, and in the ultimate analysis this surplus value forms
sums of value from which are heaped up the constantly increasing masses
of capital in the hands of the possessing classes.
[The solution] can only consist be the practical recognition of the
nature of the modern force of production, and therefore in the
of the modes of production, appropriation and exchange with the
character of the means of production.
In communist society ... society regulates the general production and
makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow ....
History is economics in action.
[T]he prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the
organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which
built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and
history of that epoch; [and] consequently the whole history of mankind
has been a history of class struggles.
What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual
changes in character b proportion as material production is changed?
ruling ideas of each age are the ideas of its ruling class.
The executive of the modem state is nothing but a committee for
the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the
[Established law, morality, religion, and culture are] merely so many
prejudices behind which lurk just as many bourgeois interests.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of man, is a demand
for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about
condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions.
The philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point,
however is to change it.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to
own use of these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in
we put to an infallible test the correctness a otherwise of our sense
If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to
an object an be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail.
The bourgeoisie is unfit ... to rule because it is incompetent to
the existence of the slave within his slavery, because it cannot help
let him sink into such a state that it has to feed him, instead of
fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other
words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.
I submit to you that if a man hasn't discovered something he will die
he isn't fit to live.
Let me first ask another question: is any more absurd contradiction
than wishing to PROVE (no matter, for the present, whether one wishes
do so from history, or from whatever else in the wide world one wishes
to prove it) that a certain person is God? To maintain that a certain
is God - that is, professes to be God - is indeed a stumbling block in
the purest sense. But what is the nature of a stumbling block? It is an
assertion which is at variance with all (human) reason. Now think of
that! But to prove something is to render it reasonable and real. Is it
possible, then, to render reasonable and real what is at variance with
all reason? Scarcely; unless one wishes to contradict one's self. One
prove only that it is at variance with all reason. The proofs for the
of Christ given in Scripture, such as the miracles and his resurrection
from the grave exist, too, only for faith; that is, they are no
for they are not meant to prove that all this agrees with reason but,
the contrary, are meant to prove that it is at variance with reason and
therefore a matter of faith.
Life can only be understood backwards, but it must be lived forwards.
It is impossible to exist without passion, unless we understand the
'exit' in the loose sense of a so-called existence.
Abstract thought ... ignores the concrete and the temporal, the
process, the predicament of the existing individual arising from his
a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal situated in existence.
I have searched with resignation for the principle of my life. ... What
did I find? Not my Self, which was what I was looking for (thinking of
my soul, if I may so express it, as shut in a box with a spring-box
external circumstances, by pressing upon the lock, were to open).
Not only is the law which I give myself ... not a law but there is a
which is given to me by one higher than I.
It is not so much a question of choosing the right as of the energy,
earnestness, the pathos with which one chooses. Thereby the personality
announces its inner infinity, and thereby, in turn, the personality is
An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the
passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an
For I should very much like to know how one could bring Abraham's act
relation with the universal, and whether it is possible to discover any
connection between what Abraham did and the universal ... except the
that he transgressed it. It was not for the sake of saving a
not to maintain the idea of the state, that Abraham did this. ...
whole action stands in no relation to the universal, is a purely
Faith is precisely the paradox that the single individual as the single
individual is higher than the universal, is justified before it, not as
inferior to it but as superior ... that the single individual as the
individual stands in absolute relation to the absolute.
It is a self-contradiction, and therefore comical, to be infinitely
in that which in its maximum still always remains an approximation. If
in spite of this, passion is nevertheless imported, we get fanaticism.
... The fault is not in the infinitely interested passion, but in
the fact that its object has become an approximation object.
In every case where the object of knowledge is the very inwardness of
subjectivity of the individual, it is necessary for the individual to
in a corresponding condition.
Our age reminds one vividly of the dissolution of the Greek city-state:
everything goes on as usual, and yet there is no longer anyone who
Passion is the real thing ... and the age in which we live is wretched,
because it is without passion.
Mankind en masse gives itself up to evil, ... nowadays it
masse. That is why people flock together, in order that natural and
animal hysteria should get hold of them, in order to feel themselves
inflamed, and ausser sich.
God is dead.
How much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because
it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for
the whole of our European morality.
Duration “in vain” without end or aim is the most paralyzing idea....
'Disinterested contemplation' ... is a rank absurdity.
All seeing is essentially perspective, and so is all knowing.
A thought comes when “it” will and not when “I” will. Thus it is a
of the evidence to say that the subject “I” conditions the predicate
And when we mix up this world of symbols with the world of things as
the symbols existed "in themselves," then we are merely doing once more
what we have always done: we are creating myths.
[H]ow wretched, how shadowy and flighty, how aimless and arbitrary, the
human intellect appears in nature. There have been eternities when it
not exist; and when it is done for again, nothing will have happened.
this intellect has no further mission that would lead beyond human life.
[T]ruths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what
they are ....
Also [conscience is] the generator of the greatest and most disastrous
of maladies, of which humanity has not to this day been cured: his
of himself, brought on by the violent severance from his animal past
Assuming, finally, that we succeeded in explaining our entire
Life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will (the
will to power, as I hold); assuming that one could trace back all the
functions to this will to power, including the solution to the problem
of generation and nutrition (they are one problem) - if this were done,
we should be justified in defining all effective energy unequivocally
will to power.
Life itself is assimilation, injury, violation of the foreign and the
suppression, hardness, the forcing of one's forms upon something else,
ingestion and - at least in its mildest form - exploitation.
The slave revolt in morals begins by rancor turning creative and giving
birth to values - the rancor of beings who, deprived of the direct
of action, compensate by an imaginary vengeance. All truly noble
grows out of triumphant self-affirmation. Slave ethics, on the other
begins by saying no to an "outside" an "other" a non-self, and that no
is its creative act.
For seventeen years I have never tired of calling attention to the
influence of our current science and industry.
Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed
[The Overman is] the truly exuberant, alive and world affirming man who
does not merely resign himself to and learn to get along with all that
was and is, but who want everything as it was and is back again, back
and ever, insatiably calling da capo, not only to himself but to the
spectacle and performance ....