Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Aesthetic & Logic

Transcendental Aesthetic



I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other a priori synthetic knowledge can be

understood. For this purpose it is required (1) that such knowledge does really flow
from the given concept, (2) that this knowledge is possible only on the assumption of
a given mode of explaining the concept. (B40)

 

  1. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. (B33) 
  2. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. (B33) 
  3. That in which alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form, cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation. (B34) 
  4. [T]here are two pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of a priori knowledge, namely, space and time. (B36) 
  5. By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space. (B37) 
  6. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time. Time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited as something in us. (B37) 
  7. Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. (B41) 
  8. The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it. (B45) 
  9. Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our perception, if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a priori. (B46) 
  10. Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner state. (B49) 
  11. Everything that is represented through a sense is so far always appearance, and consequently we must either refuse to admit that there is an inner sense, or we must recognize that the subject, which is the object of the sense, can be represented through it only as appearance, not as that subject would judge of itself if its intuition were self-activity only, that is, were intellectual. (B68) 
  12. [T]he mind, since it then intuits itself not as it would represent itself if immediately self-active, but as it is affected by itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is. (B69) 

Transcendental Logic

Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly ] complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction. (B117)

17.     If . . . we admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words, that, so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself. (B156)

18.     I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself.  (B158)

19.     We cannot think an object save through categories; we cannot know an object so thought save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so far as its object is given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Consequently, there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience." (B165-6)

 

1.      If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. (B75) 

2.      Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. (B75) 

3.      Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. (B93) 

4.      Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. (B93) 

5.      The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought. (B126) 

6.      [Categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. (B128) 

7.      [A]ll combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned . . .. (B130) 

8.      But a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in this manner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of experience, they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences. (B119) 

9.      The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. (B126) 

10.  [Categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. (B128) 

11.  [A]ll combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned . . . (B130) 

12.  It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. (B131) 

13.  For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (B132) 

14.  Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. (B137) 

15.     Therefore the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent. (B140) 

16.  Knowledge involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. (B146) 

2nd Analogy 

All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. (B232)

  1. Let us suppose that there is nothing antecedent to an event, upon which it must follow according to rule. All succession of perception would then be only in the apprehension, that is, would be merely subjective, and would never enable us to determine objectively which perceptions are those that really precede and which are those that follow. (B239) 
  2. The experience of an event [ i.e. of anything as happening ] is itself possible only on this assumption [of an antecedent cause]. (B240) 

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