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Transcendental
Aesthetic
I understand by a transcendental exposition the explanation of a
concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other a priori
synthetic knowledge can be
understood.
For this purpose it is required (1) that such knowledge does really flow
from
the given concept, (2) that this knowledge is possible only on the
assumption of
a
given mode of explaining the concept. (B40)
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- Objects are given
to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions;
they are thought through the understanding, and from the
understanding arise concepts. (B33)
- But all thought
must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain characters relate
ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to sensibility,
because in no other way can an object be given to us. (B33)
- That in which
alone the sensations can be posited and ordered in a certain form,
cannot itself be sensation; and therefore, while the matter of all
appearance is given to us a posteriori only, its form must lie ready
for the sensations a priori in the mind, and so must allow of being
considered apart from all sensation. (B34)
- [T]here are two
pure forms of sensible intuition, serving as principles of a priori
knowledge, namely, space and time. (B36)
- By means of
outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects
as outside us, and all without exception in space. (B37)
- Inner sense, by
means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state, yields
indeed no intuition of the soul itself as an object; but there is
nevertheless a determinate form [namely, time] in which alone the
intuition of inner states is possible, and everything which belongs to
inner determinations is therefore represented in relations of time.
Time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space can be intuited
as something in us. (B37)
- Space is nothing
but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective
condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible
for us. (B41)
- The true
correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and cannot
be known, through these representations; and in experience no question
is ever asked in regard to it. (B45)
- Time is not an
empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. For
neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our
perception, if the representation of time were not presupposed as
underlying them a priori. (B46)
- Time is nothing
but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and
of our inner state. (B49)
- Everything that
is represented through a sense is so far always appearance, and
consequently we must either refuse to admit that there is an inner
sense, or we must recognize that the subject, which is the object of
the sense, can be represented through it only as appearance, not as
that subject would judge of itself if its intuition were self-activity
only, that is, were intellectual. (B68)
- [T]he mind,
since it then intuits itself not as it would represent itself if
immediately self-active, but as it is affected by itself, and therefore
as it appears to itself, not as it is. (B69)
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Transcendental
Logic
Now
among the manifold concepts which form the highly ] complicated web of
human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori
employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right
to be so employed always demands a deduction. (B117)
17. If . . . we
admit that we know objects only in so far as we are externally
affected, we must also recognize, as regards inner sense, that by means
of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by
ourselves; in other words, that, so far as inner intuition is
concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in
itself. (B156)
18. I have no
knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself.
(B158)
19. We cannot think
an object save through categories; we cannot know an object so thought
save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts. Now all our
intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so far as its object is
given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience.
Consequently, there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects
of possible experience." (B165-6)
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1. If the
receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so
far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then
the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the
spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the understanding. (B75)
2. Without
sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions
without concepts are blind. (B75)
3. Concepts are
based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the
receptivity of impressions. (B93)
4. Since no
representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation
to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but
to some other representation of it, be that other representation an
intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate
knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation
of it. (B93)
5. The objective
validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on
the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them
alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a
priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of
them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought. (B126)
6. [Categories] are
concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an
object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical
functions of judgment. (B128)
7. [A]ll
combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the
manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various
concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general
title 'synthesis' may be assigned . . .. (B130)
8. But a deduction
of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in this manner; it
is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their
subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of
experience, they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth
quite other than that of descent from experiences. (B119)
9. The objective
validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on
the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them
alone does experience become possible. (B126)
10. [Categories] are
concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an
object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical
functions of judgment. (B128)
11. [A]ll
combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the
manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various
concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general
title 'synthesis' may be assigned . . . (B130)
12. It must be
possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be
thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the
representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.
(B131)
13. For the manifold
representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and
all my representations, if they did not all belong to one
self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious
of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone
they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because
otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (B132)
14. Understanding
is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge
consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an
object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a
given intuition is united. (B137)
15. Therefore the
empirical unity of consciousness, through association of
representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly
contingent. (B140)
16. Knowledge
involves two factors: first, the concept, through which an object in
general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through
which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to
the concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its
form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of
anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know,
there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could
be applied. (B146)
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