John Locke (1632-1704): 
Empiricism & Democracy
  • Common Sense contra Rationalism
    • In general, absolute certainty is neither necessary nor attainable outside of mathematics {1}
      • witness the insoluble disagreements of the rationalists, about substance, e.g. {2}
        • Descartes: 2 types (+ God): extended & thinking: 1 individual body: infinitely many minds
        • Spinoza: 2 "types" as understood: 1 individual (God or Nature) token 
        • Leibniz: 1 type,  minds: infinitely many individual or tokens
      • observation & trial & error not (just) mathematics required for real-world knowledge: medicine v. mathematics {3}
    • probability is all that's achievable in most connections and is generally sufficient for the conduct of our practical affairs
  • Starting point of inquiry should be inquiry into our own mental powers with an eye to determining their powers and, especially, their limitations. {4}
    • must track ideas back to their source in experience {5}
    • if they have no basis in experience they don't signify anything -- they're just empty words with no thoughts corresponding
  1. If we disbelieve everything because we cannot certainly know all things we shall do . . . as wisely as he who would not use his legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no wings to fly (I: i:5 )
  2. I suspected [on the rationalist plan] we began at the wrong end . . .. Thus . . . extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes . . . never coming to any clear resolution . . . (I:i:7)
  3. He that in physic shall lay down fundamental maxims, and, from thence drawing consequences and raising disputes, shall reduce it into the regular form of a science, has indeed done something to enlarge the art of talking and perhaps laid a foundation for endless disputes; but if he hopes to bring men by such a system to the knowledge of . . . the constitution, nature, signs, changes, and history of diseases . . . [he] takes much [the same] course with him that should walk up and down in a thick wood, overgrown with briars and thorns, with a design to take a view and draw a map of the country. (241)
  4. I thought the first step towards satisfying the several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into was to take a survey of our understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they are adapted. (I:i:7)
  5. [Idea] being that term which, I think, best serves to stand for whatsoever is the object of understanding when a man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking . . . (I:i:8)
  • Innate Ideas: e.g., God, Substance, Cause
    • Very general & abstract ideas
    • That could not arise from experience
    • Clearly & distinctly intellectually intuited 
    • Source of indubitable a priori knowledge about nature & reality.
  • Claimed innate knowledge claims are all either dubious or fatuous
    • dubious: conflicting rationalist claims about the nature and number of substances
    • fatuous: "What is is"; "The whole is greater than the part." {1}
  • We have no such clear and distinct understandings of various candidate ideas as rationalists maintain. {2}
  • Children & savages & the uneducated have no inking at all of any such abstract and general notions as these abstract ideas are supposed to be.
    • if an idea is in you you must be aware of it {3}
  • Leibniz's reply:
    • unconscious ideas are possible -- contra Locke & Descartes both
    • the issue is epistemological (what justifies claims to knowledge of necessary truths), not psychological (what suggests them to us).
  • It will clinch case against the innateness any presumed innate idea if
    • we can explain how the candidate ideas -- such as God -- arises from experience {4} {5}
    • or that we really have no such (clear and distinct) idea -- e.g. substance. {6}
  1. [Newton] demonstrated several propositions, which are so many new truths before unknown to the world, and are further advances in mathematical knowledge: but, for the discover of these it was not the general maxims "what is is"; or "the whole is bigger than a part," or the like that helped him. (IV:vii:11)
  2. [O]ur idea of sameness is not so settled and clear as to deserve to be thought innate in us. (I:ii:4)
  3. No proposition [or idea] can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. (I:ii:5)
  4. It would suffice to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition [innate ideas] if I should only show . . . how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions and or principles. (I:ii:1)
  5. And if they . . . carry the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary . . . the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the farther; especially if it be an idea . . . naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. (I:ii:9)
  6. [W]e have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i.e., of something whereof we have no particular and distinct positive idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, or those ideas we do know. 
All Ideas
  • The mind, at birth, is a blank slate, a tabula rasa on which experience writes {1}
    • Outer experience: sensation: furnishes sensory qualities, e.g., yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet" {2}
    • Inner experience: reflection: furnishes "ideas which could not be had from things without," e.g., "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing" {3}
  • Simple & Complex Ideas: by combining simple ideas (e.g., red, round, sweet) we form complex ones (e.g., cherry). {4}
    • Simple Ideas {5}
      • In things qualities which affect the senses are "united and blended" but they "enter by the senses simple and unmixed" {6}
      • Ideas deriving from sensation {7}
        • special sensibles:
          1. tastes (sweet), 
          2. feels (solid, smooth), 
          3. odors (floral), 
          4. sounds (dull thud),
          5. colors (yellow, white).
        • common sensibles: motion (still), shape (blocky), texture (smooth): can be both felt and seen
      • Ideas deriving from reflection {8}
        • thought or perception: e.g., remembering, discerning, reasoning, knowing, faith.
        • volition or willing: wishing, preferring, choosing, desiring
    • Complex ideas constructed from simple ones by various operations of the understanding {9}
      • union: this cherry
      • comparison: this cherry is sweeter than that apple
      • abstraction: by which the mind separates on idea from all those that accompany it: source of general ideas, {10}{11}
        • e.g. cherry:
          • abstract out, on tree (v. in bowl), 
          • Bing (v. Lady Ann), 
          • etc. 
        • e.g. whiteness
          • abstract out, the milk, the snow, the chalk, etc.
      • Compare: white and whiteness
        • this white simply an image
        • whiteness an complex abstraction from all the simple whites I've experienced
  • The Idea of Substance
    • Particular Sorts of Substances 
      • examples: man, horse | gold, water {12}
      • complex idea of = 
        • ideas of certain qualities or accidents +
        • obscure idea of substance or support +
        • idea of power: to cause & be affected
    • Our obscure idea of substance in general -- the substratum
      • bearer of properties:
      • "something I know not what" {13}{14}
        • what's extended <> extension
        • what thinks <> thought  {15}
    • Power
      1. Passive power or receptivity of change: from sensation: we observe the alterations of bodies 
      2. Active power or initiation of change: from reflection: from our experience of willing. {16}
      3. Element of necessity: the causal agent makes the patient change: the cause necessitates the effect: day always follows night, but fire causes heat {17}
  1. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? .... To this I answer in one word, from experience. (II:i:2)
  2. The great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation. (II:i:3)
  3. By reflection . . . I would be understood to mean that notice the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them. (II:i:4)
  4. The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the ideas that we have; and that is, that some of them are simple and some complex. (246)
  5. [T]here is nothing that can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas; which, being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception in the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas. (II:ii:1)
  6. [I]t is plain that the ideas that [perceived things] produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed. (II:ii:1)
  7. I would have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds. (II,ii,2)
  8. The two great and principle actions of the mind . . . that everyone who pleases may take notice of . . . in himself, are these two: perception or thinking; and volition or willing. (II:vi:2)
  9. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas it can, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, . . .and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. (II:ii,2)
  10. The use of words then being made to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas received from the particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called abstraction whereby ideas take from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind, and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. (II:xi:9)
  11. Thus the same colour, being observed today in chalk or snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it a representative of all that kind; and having given it the name whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quantity wheresoever it be imagined or met with: And thus universals, whether terms or ideas, are made." (II:xi:9)
  12. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances. (II:xxiii:3)
  13. If anyone should be asked what is the subject wherein colour or weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts; and if he were demanded, what is it that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian . . . who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on; to which his answer was -- a great tortoise: but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied -- something he knew not what. (II:xxiii:2)
  14. The idea . . . to which we give the general name substance [is] nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot exist sine re substante, without something to support them. (II:xxiii:2)
  15. [W]e have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the substratum of those simple ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with like ignorance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations we experiment in ourselves within. (II:xxiii:5)
  16. The idea of a beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience that barely by willing it . . . we can move the parts of our bodies. (II:xxi: 4}
  17. The mind [takes] notice how one [thing] comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; . . . and [concludes] from what it has constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like agents, and by the like ways, . . . and so comes by that idea we call power.  (II:xxi:1)
  • Degrees of cognitive adequacy or knowledge
    • Certain
      • immediate certainty or intuition 
        • the mind immediately "sees" something to be: knowledge of own mind {1} and its contents: its ideas and their relations {9}
        • or be necessary, e.g., that nothing can come from nothing {2}
      • mediate certainty or demonstration 
        • the mind infers a necessary connection by a series of immediately "seen" steps.
        • knowledge of God's nature & existence {3}
    • Uncertain: sensation based "faith" or "opinion": based on experience or induction from experience: have probable assurance of these things or assurance sufficient for the guidance of action or practice.
      • external bodies {4}
      • other minds {5}
  • Ideas and Qualities {6}
    • Ideas: what the mind perceives in itself: e.g., the sensation of coldness, whiteness, roundness
    • Qualities: the power in the thing to produce these ideas in our minds: the whiteness, coldness, etc. of the snowball = its power to affect us in these ways.
  • Primary Qualities {7}
    • utterly inseparable from bodies
    • resemble the ideas they produce in us
    • short list: solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number
  • Secondary Qualities {8}
    • nothing in the bodies themselves
    • don't resemble the ideas they produce
    • all the special sensible qualities of this nature
  1. [W]e have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are (IV:ix:3) 
  2. In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles.  (IV:ix:3)
  3. If, therefore, there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something . . . .  And that eternal being must be most powerful.  . . .  This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful. . . .  And therefore God. (IV:x:6)
  4. [Regarding external existence] I have not that certainty of it that we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence (IV:ix:9)
  5. And, therefore, though it be highly probable that millions of me do now exist, yet . . . I have not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are men . . . now in the world: but this is but probability, not knowledge. (IV:xi:9)
  6. Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call a quality of the subject wherein that power is. (II:viii:8)
  7. These I call original or primary qualities of bodies . . . solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. (II:viii:9)
  8. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e., by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts. (II:viii:10).
  9. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another.  . . .  By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree. (IV:i:4)
  • Hedonism: the intrinsic good = pleasure {1}
    • pleasure is the only thing good in and of itself
    • pain is the only thing bad in and of itself
    • every other good or bad thing is instrumentally so
      • good if apt to increase pleasure or diminish pain
      • bad if vice versa
  • No idea is ever experienced "barely in itself"; every idea is "accompanied with pain or pleasure".
  • The ethical problem is to ascertain which course of action produces the greatest good, i.e., the least pain and the most pleasure, and do that.
    • not always easy to ascertain since it's not just immediate p&p to be considered p&p in the long run and all things considered {3}
    • not always easy to do it once ascertained since we may be led astray by immediate p&p: incontinence or "weakness of will" {2}
  • Law
    • embodies the accumulated experience of others about what maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain in the long run and all things considered
    • brings the long term consequences to bear more immediately by imposing punishment for bad deeds and rewards for good behavior. 
    • three sorts of moral rules or laws with three different enforcements {4}
      1. divine laws: salvation & damnation: though not immediate their "infinite weight" and certitude lend them present influence. {6}
      2. civil laws: carry legal sanctions: reflects law of opinion & should aspire to embody divine law.
      3. law of opinion or reputations: bring praise or approbation or disgrace and condemnation. {5}
  • Ethics can be an exact science {7} 
    • proceed from definitions of "justice," "right," etc.
    • to deduce theorems, e.g.,
      1. Where there is no property there is no injustice.
      2. No government allows absolute liberty.
    • criticisms:  giving no moral guidance.
      1. these are empty tautologies: So is murdering someone without property unjust?  No: life is property Locke says since a life can be unjustly taken. {8}
      2. So should alcohol be made illegal? 
  1.  Things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain.  That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preserve us in the possession of any other good or absence of any evil.  And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is apt ot produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us. (259)
  2. Let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink attends him in the course he follows: yet the . . . habitual thirst after his cups . . . drives him to the tavern.  . . .  It is not want of viewing the greater good: for he sees and acknowledges it.  (260)
  3. As to present happiness and misery, when that alone comes into consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a man never chooses amiss: he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually prefers.  (260)
  4. The laws [are] these three: 1. The divine law.  2. The civil law.  3. The law of opinion or reputation, if I may so call it.  By the relation they bear to the first of these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether they be virtues or vices. (262)
  5. [H]e who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skilled in the history of mankind: the greatest part whereof we shall  find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this law of fashion. (262)
  6. [God] has the power to enforce [divine law] by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us out of his hands.
  7. I am bold to think morality capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered; in which consists perfect knowledge.
  8. "Where there is no property there is no injustice," is a proposition as sure as any demonstration of Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to anything, and the idea to which the name "injustice is given being the invasion or violation of a right, it is evident that . . . I can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. (264) 
  • State of nature {1}
    • a state of perfect liberty
    • but not, contrary to Hobbes, of license {2}
    • each endowed by law of Nature with creator with natural rights {3}
      • life
      • liberty
      • property
    • these rights may not be transgressed except to better preserve these very rights from unjust transgression. {4}
    • Reply to the objection that there never was such a state of Nature
      • rulers of political states are in that state
      • and so is everyone else by birth, until they consent to recognize some political authority. {5}
    • Underlying ideal of equality
      • not equality of position or income or achievement {6}
        • depends on merit
        • birth & connections, etc.
      • equality of natural rights: political equality {7}
  • Political authority derives from the consent of the governed {8}
    • people are and remain sovereign
    • a collection of autonomous and independent individuals
    • who may not be compelled to join a community
    • but who agree to be accept communal authority in the form of majority (or super majority) rule once they belong. {9}
  • Property {10}
    • in a state of nature the earth and all it contains are the common inheritance of all. 
    • but each has exclusive natural rights of ownership to their own bodies
    • and by extension, to the fruits of their labor
    • but, by rights, one may acquire only as much property as one can use.
      • this applies to land and its produce {11}
      • but not to money {12}
    • Issue: "Locke's rule was that `appropriation' must not `invade the rights of others.'  It is not self-evident that massive accumulation of capital in a few hands is harmless.  Indeed there may well be a contradiction between the political equality on which Locke insisted so eloquently and the economic inequality that his doctrine of property approves." (Jones, p. 273)
  • Utility of Political Societies
    • Our natural rights to life, liberty, and property may be to easily transgressed by others in the state of Nature {13} for three reasons {14}
      1. the absence of any settled commonly agreed upon rules
      2. the absence of any impartial judges to apply the rules
      3. absence of accepted agencies for punishing transgressions. 
    • We consent to the diminution of our rights in exchange for greater security in the enjoyment of these diminished rights -- especially property rights. {15}
  • Locke v. Hobbes: The Social Contract
    • Human Nature
      • H: selfish & irrational
      • L: sociable & rational
    • The state of nature
      • H: intolerable war of each against all
      • L: not so awful, but capable of improvement
    • The grant of political authority
      • H: by forced consent, absolute, & irrevocable
      • L: by free consent, limited, & revocable
    • Type of government licensed by the Social Contract
      • H: autocracy (monarchy or dictatorship)
      • L: representative democracy with legislative and executive powers "in distinct hands."
  • Locke & Religious Toleration
    • various religious beliefs and practices do not threaten the state unless the state tries to suppress them -- which makes them hostile to it {16}
    • therefore there should be complete toleration of religious belief {17}
    • and toleration of religions practices so long as they do not threaten peoples' lives, liberty, or property. {18}
    • separation of church and state. {19}
  1. To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom. (267)
  2. But thought this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license. (267)
  3. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions . . . . (267)
  4. And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed . . . the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands, whereby every one has the a right to punish the transgressor of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation. (267)
  5. To those that say that there were never any men in the state of Nature, I . . . affirm that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so till, by their own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society . . . . (268)
  6. Though I have said . . . "That all men by nature are equal," I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of "equality." (269)
  7. [Y]et all this consists with the equality which all men are in in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another . . . being that equal right that each man hath to his natural freedom . . . . (269)
  8. Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent . . . . (269-270)
  9. Whosoever, therefore, . . . unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. (270)
  10. [T]hough the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a "property" in his own "person."  This nobody has any right to but himself.  The "labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. (271)
  11. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in.  Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others. (271)
  12. [G]old and silver may be hoarded up without injury to anyone. (272)
  13. [W]hy will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power?  To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasions of others. (273)
  14. Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide controversies among them.  . . .  Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all the differences according to the established law.  . . . Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. (273-274)
  15. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting. (273)
  16. The magistrate is afraid of other Churches, but not of his own; because he is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and cruel to the other. (276)
  17. [I]t is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws, which are not in men's powers to perform.  And to believe this or that to be true, does not depend on our will. (276)
  18. The business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of th Commonwealth, and of every particular man's goods and person. (276)
  19. If each of them [state and Church] would contain itself within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the Commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls, 'tis impossible any discord should ever have happened between them. (277)
  • Will: the power of the mind to control its own thoughts and the associated body {1}
  • Volition: exercise of the will: an order or command of the mind. {2}
  • Voluntary & Involuntary
    • voluntary: volition caused or commanded by the mind.
    • involuntary: not so caused
  • Liberty and Necessity: concerned not with the act itself, but with the efficacy of the willing. {3}
    • liberty = "power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preferences or direction of his own mind" (II:xxi:8) 
    • necessity = "wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it." (II:xxi: 8)
      • external constraint: falling 
      • internal constraints:
        • physical: e.g. convulsions & reflexes
        • mental: e.g., boistrous passions
  • Alleged upshots of these analyses:
    • some voluntary acts are not free: against the traditional identification. {4}
    • the absolute free will question-- is the volition free? -- is nonsensical 
      • Locke: freedom concerns effects {5}
      • Worry about absolute freedom an absurd worry {6} {7} 
  • Human Identity: same man (as for any organism or mechanism) {8}
    • <> same person (see the prince and the cobbler thought experiment). {9}
    • <> same soul or thinking substance 
  • Personal Identity: "same [train of] consciousness": "As far as consciousness can be extended backwards . . . so far reaches the identity of that person."  {10}
  • Same Soul <> Person in principle (1 per in fact)
    • possibly same person different soul: I'm a new substance every time I wake. {11}
    • possibly different persons share one soul: reincarnation one such possibility. 
  1. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. (II:xxi:5)
  2. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. (II:xxi:5)
  3. From consideration of the power of the mind over the action of man, which everyone finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity. (II:xxi: 7)
  4. [L]iberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition where there is no liberty. (II:xxi:8)
  5. So far as anyone can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action and vice versa, make it to exist or not to exist; so far is he free. (II:xxi:21)
  6. [I]t passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills . (II:xxi: 22).
  7. [A] question that needs no answer": it's "to ask whether a man can will what he wills and they who can make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of another; and so on in infinitum. (II:xxi:25)
  8. [It is] one thing to be the same substance another to be the same man, and a third to be the same person, if person, man and substance are three names standing for different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity (II:xxvii:7).
  9. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler . . . everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would say it's the same man. (II:xxvii: 15)
  10. [A person] is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different places or times, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking . . . . (II: xvii:9)
  11. I say . . . our consciousness being interrupted and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e., the same substance or no. (II:xxvii: 10)

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