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Ethical
Theory
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- Hedonism:
the intrinsic good = pleasure {1}
- pleasure is the only thing good
in and of itself
- pain is the only thing bad in and
of itself
- every other good or bad thing is instrumentally
so
- good if apt to increase pleasure
or diminish pain
- bad if vice versa
- No
idea is ever experienced "barely in itself"; every idea is "accompanied
with pain or pleasure".
- The
ethical problem is to ascertain which course of action produces the
greatest good, i.e., the least pain and the most pleasure, and do that.
- not always easy to ascertain
since it's not just immediate p&p to be considered p&p in
the long run and all things considered {3}
- not always easy to do it once
ascertained since we may be led astray by immediate p&p:
incontinence or "weakness of will" {2}
- Law
- embodies the accumulated
experience of others about what maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain
in the long run and all things considered
- brings the long term consequences
to bear more immediately by imposing punishment for bad
deeds and rewards for good behavior.
- three sorts of moral rules or
laws with three different enforcements {4}
1.
divine laws: salvation & damnation: though not immediate
their "infinite weight" and certitude lend them present influence. {6}
2.
civil laws: carry legal sanctions: reflects law of opinion & should
aspire to embody divine law.
3.
law of opinion or reputations: bring praise or
approbation or disgrace and condemnation. {5}
- Ethics
can be an exact science {7}
- proceed from definitions of
"justice," "right," etc.
- to deduce theorems, e.g.,
0.
Where there is no property there is no injustice.
1.
No government allows absolute liberty.
- criticisms: giving no moral
guidance.
0.
these are empty tautologies: So is murdering someone without property
unjust? No: life is property Locke says since a life can be
unjustly taken. {8}
1.
So should alcohol be made illegal?
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1. Things are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or
pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or
increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or
preserve us in the possession of any other good or absence of any
evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil which is
apt ot produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us.
(259)
2. Let
a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes; discredit and
diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink attends
him in the course he follows: yet the . . . habitual thirst after his
cups . . . drives him to the tavern. . . . It is not want
of viewing the greater good: for he sees and acknowledges it.
(260)
3. As
to present happiness and misery, when that alone comes into
consideration, and the consequences are quite removed, a man never
chooses amiss: he knows what best pleases him, and that he actually
prefers. (260)
4. The
laws [are] these three: 1. The divine law. 2. The civil
law. 3. The law of opinion or reputation,
if I may so call it. By the relation they bear to the first of
these, men judge whether their actions are sins or duties; by the
second, whether they be criminal or innocent; and by the third, whether
they be virtues or vices. (262)
5. [H]e
who imagines commendation and disgrace not to be strong motives to men
to accommodate themselves to the opinions and rules of those with whom
they converse, seems little skilled in the history of mankind: the
greatest part whereof we shall find to govern themselves chiefly,
if not solely, by this law of fashion. (262)
6. [God]
has the power to enforce [divine law] by rewards and punishments of
infinite weight and duration in another life; for nobody can take us
out of his hands.
7. I
am bold to think morality capable of demonstration, as well as
mathematics: since the precise real essence of the things moral words
stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity and incongruity
of the things themselves be certainly discovered; in which consists
perfect knowledge.
- "Where there is
no property there is no injustice," is a proposition as sure as any
demonstration of Euclid: for the idea of property being a right to
anything, and the idea to which the name "injustice is given being the
invasion or violation of a right, it is evident that . . . I can as
certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has
three angles equal to two right ones. (264)
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Political
Theory
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- State of nature {1}
- a state of
perfect liberty
- but not,
contrary to Hobbes, of license {2}
- each endowed by
law of Nature with creator with natural rights {3}
- these rights may
not be transgressed except to better preserve these very rights
from unjust transgression. {4}
- Reply to the
objection that there never was such a state of Nature
- rulers of
political states are in that state
- and so is
everyone else by birth, until they consent to recognize some political
authority. {5}
- Underlying ideal
of equality
- not equality of
position or income or achievement {6}
- depends on merit
- birth &
connections, etc.
- equality of
natural rights: political equality {7}
- Political
authority derives from the consent of the governed {8}
- people are and
remain sovereign
- a collection of
autonomous and independent individuals
- who may not be
compelled to join a community
- but who agree to
be accept communal authority in the form of majority (or super
majority) rule once they belong. {9}
- Property {10}
- in a state of
nature the earth and all it contains are the common inheritance of
all.
- but each has
exclusive natural rights of ownership to their own bodies
- and by
extension, to the fruits of their labor
- but, by rights,
one may acquire only as much property as one can use.
- this applies to
land and its produce {11}
- but not to money
{12}
- Issue: "Locke's
rule was that `appropriation' must not `invade the rights of
others.' It is not self-evident that massive accumulation of
capital in a few hands is harmless. Indeed there may well be a
contradiction between the political equality on which Locke insisted so
eloquently and the economic inequality that his doctrine of property
approves." (Jones, p. 273)
- Utility of
Political Societies
- Our natural
rights to life, liberty, and property may be to easily transgressed by
others in the state of Nature {13} for three
reasons {14}
1.
the
absence of any settled commonly agreed upon rules
2.
the
absence of any impartial judges to apply the rules
3.
absence
of accepted agencies for punishing transgressions.
- We consent to
the diminution of our rights in exchange for greater security in the enjoyment
of these diminished rights -- especially property rights. {15}
- Locke v. Hobbes:
The Social Contract
- H: selfish &
irrational
- L: sociable
& rational
- The state of
nature
- H: intolerable
war of each against all
- L: not so awful,
but capable of improvement
- The grant of
political authority
- H: by forced
consent, absolute, & irrevocable
- L: by free
consent, limited, & revocable
- Type of
government licensed by the Social Contract
- H: autocracy
(monarchy or dictatorship)
- L:
representative democracy with legislative and executive powers "in
distinct hands."
- Locke &
Religious Toleration
- various
religious beliefs and practices do not threaten the state unless the
state tries to suppress them -- which makes them hostile to it {16}
- therefore there
should be complete toleration of religious belief {17}
- and toleration
of religions practices so long as they do not threaten peoples' lives,
liberty, or property. {18}
- separation of
church and state. {19}
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1. To
understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we
must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a
state of perfect freedom. (267)
2. But thought this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a
state of license. (267)
3. The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all
mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent,
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or
possessions . . . . (267)
4. And that all men may be restrained from invading others'
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be
observed . . . the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put
into every man's hands, whereby every one has the a right to punish the
transgressor of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation.
(267)
5. To those that say that there were never any men in the
state of Nature, I . . . affirm that all men are naturally in that
state, and remain so till, by their own consents, they make themselves
members of some politic society . . . . (268)
6. Though
I have said . . . "That all men by nature are equal," I cannot be
supposed to understand all sorts of "equality." (269)
7. [Y]et
all this consists with the equality which all men are in in respect of
jurisdiction or dominion one over another . . . being that equal right
that each man hath to his natural freedom . . . . (269)
8. Men
being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent, no
one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power
of another without his own consent . . . . (269-270)
9. Whosoever,
therefore, . . . unite into a community, must be understood to give up
all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society
to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any
number greater than the majority. (270)
10. [T]hough
the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any
right to but himself. The "labour" of his body and the "work" of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. (271)
11. As
much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it
spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever
is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others. (271)
12. [G]old
and silver may be hoarded up without injury to anyone. (272)
13. [W]hy
will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the
dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious
to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet
the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the
invasions of others. (273)
14. Firstly,
there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by
common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common
measure to decide controversies among them. . . . Secondly,
in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with
authority to determine all the differences according to the established
law. . . . Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants
power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due
execution. (273-274)
15. The
great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and
putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things
wanting. (273)
16. The
magistrate is afraid of other Churches, but not of his own; because he
is kind and favourable to the one, but severe and cruel to the other.
(276)
17. [I]t
is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws, which are not in
men's powers to perform. And to believe this or that to be true,
does not depend on our will. (276)
18. The
business of laws is not to provide for the truth of opinions, but for
the safety and security of th Commonwealth, and of every particular
man's goods and person. (276)
- If each of them
[state and Church] would contain itself within its own bounds, the one
attending to the worldly welfare of the Commonwealth, the other to the
salvation of souls, 'tis impossible any discord should ever have
happened between them. (277)
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Freedom
and Necessity
Aristotle
Involuntary: not from desire
voluntary*: from desire.
chosen: from desire
via deliberation (Locke's "voluntary").
Free
Will Controversy
Whether
our so called free choices (our voluntary acts in Locke's sense) are
uncaused. Whether there's "absolute will" (Spinoza): willing that's totally
free and unconstrained.
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- Will: the power of
the mind to control its own thoughts and the associated body {1} {2}
- Volition: exercise of the
will: an order or command of the mind. {3}
- Voluntary &
Involuntary
- voluntary: volition caused
or commanded by the mind.
- involuntary: not so caused
- Liberty and Necessity:
concerned not with the act itself, but with the efficacy of the
willing. {4}
- liberty = "power to
think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the
preferences or direction of his own mind" (xxi:8) {6}
= the absence of constraint
- necessity = "wherever
doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his
mind directing it." (xxi: 8) = constraint
- external
constraint: e.g., falling
- internal
constraints:
- physical: e.g.
convulsions & reflexes
- mental: e.g.,
boistrous passions
- Alleged upshots
of these analyses:
- some voluntary
acts are not free: against the traditional identification. {5}
- the traditional
free will question is nonsensical & so neither requires nor allows
answering {7}
- Free will again:
is the volition free?! {8}
- Locke: freedom
concerns effects or efficacy of volition
- Worry about
absolute freedom
- concerns cause
of volition
- an impractical {9} and absurd {10} worry
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- The idea of a
beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in
ourselves, where we find by experience that barely by willing it . . .
we can move the parts of our bodies. (xxi: 4}
- This power which
the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the
forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the
body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that
which we call the will. (xxi:5)
- The actual
exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its
forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. The forbearance
of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is
called voluntary. And whatsoever action is performed without
such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary. (xxi:5)
- From
consideration of the power of the mind over the action of man, which
everyone finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.
(xxi: 7)
- [L]iberty cannot
be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be
thought, there may be will, there may be volition where there is no
liberty. (xxi:8)
- So far as anyone
can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence
of any action to the non-existence of that action and vice versa, make
it to exist or not to exist; so far is he free. (xxi:21)
- [T]o ask whether
the will has freedom is to ask whether one power has another power, one
ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd
to make dispute or need an answer. For . . . powers belong only to
agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of powers
themselves. (xxi: 16)
- [T]hey who can
make a question of it must suppose one will to determine the acts of
another; and so on in infinitum. (xxi:25)
- [I]t passes for
a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to
will as he is to act what he wills (xxi: 22).
- [A] question
that needs no answer [is] to ask whether a man can will what he wills.
(xxi: 25)
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Identity
and Diversity
Note: Leibniz's
I-of-I laws address how numerical and qualitative identity relate.
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- At issue: "the
very being of things" {1} especially
- their continuity
across time
- through various
changes
- Qualitative v.
Numerical Identity
- Qualitative: how
identical twins are identical
- likeness or
similarity in properties
- as between two
or more separate and distinct individuals
- Numerical:
wherein identical twins differ
- nothing is
identical with anything else
- everything is
identical with itself
- Identity, time,
and place: distinct things have distinct spatio-temporal origins. {2} {3}
- Identity of
sorts of substances: God, Bods, & Finite Intelligences {4}
- God: doesn't
change over time: no problem {5}
- finite spirits:
distinguished by time & place of origin. {6}
- bodies as
bodies {7}
- distinguished by
time and place of origin
- so long as "no
addition or subtraction of matter"
- Events: property
instantiations
- in general:
identified by their time and place of origin {8}
- special case:
momentary existents: changes -- e.g., thoughts & motions -- have
definite spatio-temporal loci: but no duration
- Principle of
Individuation by Sorts
- simple masses:
remain the same so long a no addition or subtraction of matter is made
- same statue:
remains the same so long as no change in the form is made.
- organisms:
remain numerically the same despite additions & subtractions: e.g.,
acorn to oak.
- observation:
relativity of identity to sort: "in these two cases - a mass of matter
and a living body- identity is not applied to the same thing." (xxvii:3)
- Organisms:
continuity of life or "like continued [functioning] organization
conformable to that species" (xxvii: 4)
- Brutes &
Machines: cf. Ship of Theseus
- animals like
plants and machines
- identity
determined by enduring funtional organization {9}
- Human Identity: same
man (as for any organism above)
- <> same
person (see the prince and the cobbler thought experiment).
- <> same
soul or thinking substance
- Personal
Identity: "same [train of] consciousness" {12}
- Same Soul
<> Person in principle (1 per in fact)
- possibly same
person different soul: I'm a new substance every time I wake. {13}
- possibly
different persons share one soul: reincarnation one such possibility.
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- Another occasion
the mind often takes of comparing, is the very being of things, when,
considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we
compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the
ideas of identity and diversity. (xxvii: 1)
- For we never
finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two things of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same time, we rightly conclude
that whatever exists anywhere at any time excludes all the same kind
and is there itself alone. (xxvii:1)
- From whence it
follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two
things one beginning. (xvii:1)
- We have the
ideas but of three sorts of substances: 1. God. 2. Finite
intelligences. 3. Bodies.
- God is without
beginning, eternal, unalterable, and everywhere, and therefore
concerning his identity there can be no doubt. (xxvii:2)
- Secondly, Finite
spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to
exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to
each of them its identity, as long as it exists. (xxvii:2)
- Thirdly, The
same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or
subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. (xxvii:2)
- All other things
being but modes or relations ultimately terminated in substances, the
identity and diversity of each particular existence of them too will be
by the same way determined. (xxvii:2)
- I say . . . our
consciousness being interrupted and we losing the sight of our past
selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e.,
the same substance or no (10)
- As far as
consciousness can be extended backwards . . . so far reaches the
identity of that person. (xxvii: 10)
- For should the
soul of a prince, carrying with it the conscious-ness of the prince's
past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler . . . everyone sees
he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the
prince's actions: but who would say it's the same man. (xxvii: 15)
- [A person is] a
thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different places
or times, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable
from thinking. (xvii:9)
- [It is] one
thing to be the same substance another to be the same man,
and a third to be the same person, if person, man
and substance are three names standing for different ideas; for
such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity
(II:xxvii:7).
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