(i:P2) Two substances having different attributes
have nothing in common with one another. [D3]
(i:P3) If things have nothing in common
with one another, one of them cannot cause [any effect in] the other. [P2,
(i:A4) The knowledge of an effect depends
on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.
(i:A5) Things that have nothing in common
cannot be explained through one another, or, the concept of the one does
not involve the concept of the other.
(i:D3) By substance I mean that which
is in itself, and is conceived through itself, in other words, that of
which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
(ii:P7) The order and connection of ideas
is the same as the order and connection of things.
(ii:P2) Extension is an attribute
of God, or God is an extended thing.
Thought is an attribute of God, or God is
a thinking thing.
(i:P1) A substance is prior in nature to
(i:D4) By attribute, I mean that
which which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
(i:D5) By mode, I mean the modifications
of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something
other than itself.
(i:D1) By that which is self-caused,
I mean that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature
cannot be conceived except as existing.
(i:D6) By God, I mean a being absolutely
infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of
which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.
(i:P11) God, or a substance consisting of
infinite attributes each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence,
necessarily exists. [A7, P7]
(i:A7) If a thing can be conceived as not
existing, its essence does not involve existence.
(i:P7) It pertains to the nature of substance
exist. [P6, D1]
(i:P14) Except God no substance can be conceived.
[D6, P11, P5]
(i:P15) Whatever is, is in God, and nothing
can be or be conceived without God. [P14, D3, D5, A1]
(i:P17:C2:Note) For intellect and will,
which should constitute the essence of God [conceived personally], would
perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human intellect and will,
in fact, would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would
be about as much correspondence between the two as between the Dog, the
heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.
(i:P17:C2:Note) If intellect belongs to
the divine nature, it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought
to be, posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood, inasmuch
as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality. On the
contrary, the truth and formal essence of all things is as it is, because
it exists by representation as such in the intellect of God.
(i:Appendix) Nature has no end set before
it. ... If God acts for the sake of an end, he [must] want something that
(P33:Note) [T]hey have … attribute[d] another
freedom to God, far different from that we taught (D7),
viz. an absolute will.
(i:D7) A thing is called free which exists
from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself
alone. A thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is
determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and
(ii:P7) The order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things.
(ii:P10) The being of substance does not pertain to
the essence of man.
(ii:P13:Note.) [T]he things we have shown so far are completely
general and do not pertain more to man than to other individuals, all of
which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each
thing there is necessarily an idea in God, or which God is the cause in
the same way as he is of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we
have said of the idea of the human Body must also be said of the idea of
[A] body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined
to a state of rest by some other body; and a body at rest remains so until
it is determined to a state of motion my some other body. (209)
(iii:P5) Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors
to persist in its own being.
(i:A6) A true idea must agree with its object.
(ii:P16) The idea of every mode, in which the human body
is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body,
and also the nature of the external body.
(ii:P32) All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God,
(ii:P48): In the Mind there is no absolute, or free,
will, but the Mind is determined to will this or that by a cause, which
is also determined by another, and this again by another, and so to infinity.
(iv:Preface) As for the terms good and bad,
they indicate no positive quality in things regarded in themselves, but
are merely modes of thinking, or notions which we form from the comparison
of things with one another. Thus one and the same thing can be at
the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For instance music is good
for him that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf
it it neither good nor bad.
(i:P33) Things could be produced by God in no other
way and in no other order than they have been produced.
(ii:P49:note) We should await and endure fortune's smiles
or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal
decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of
a triangle that the three angles are equal to two right angles.