Observation and Theory
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OHear: Chap. 5
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Observational Common Ground Between Theories
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Working assumption of Logical Empiricist program
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Distinction between Observational and Theoretical
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Question: How is theory grounded in observation?
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surely this is the key thing that distinguishes science
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the responsiveness of its conceptions and its posits to the evidence.
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the evidence of our senses: observed & experimental evidence.
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and what's chiefly lacking in nonscience
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groundless metaphysical speculation
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pseudo-sciences like astrology
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Attempts were made to define theoretical terms in terms of their
observational bases
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Try: X is an acid iff X turns blue litmus red, . .
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Problems with so-called operational definitions
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technical difficulties
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conceptual difficulty:
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what it means to be an acid has more to do with theoretical
interconnections
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acid:
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any of various typically water-soluble and sour compounds that redden
litmus,
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that are capable of reacting with a base to form a salt,
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that are hydrogen-containing molecules or ions able to give up a
proton
to a base,
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or that are substances able to accept an unshared pair of electrons
from a base.
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the true or more basic definitions 3 & 4 are entirely
theoretical
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if a substance meets 4 but not 1 it's still be an acid
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if some substance meets 1 but not 4 it's not an acid.
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Subsequent attempts tried to tie down theoretical statements to
observational bases
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not term by term . . . by definitions
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but statement by statement: e.g. All acids give up hydrogen ions in
water solutions.
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confirmation and/or falsification
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we make predictions from the theoretical statement: (x)(Tx -> (O1x ->
O2x))
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we observe O1x and O2x (or not)
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if not Tx is disconfirmed
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if so Tx is confirmed
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assumption:
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we can isolate the O statements from the Ts
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and T's from each other so that
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each T statement has an O basis of its own
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crash & burn: the assumptions are false
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we can't strictly isolate the Os and Ts.
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water?
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litmus?
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substance?
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we can't test the Ts in isolation
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predictive failure always can be blamed on theory involving auxilliary
hypotheses, e.g.,
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from the same theoretical bailiwick: chemical theory
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whether this (colorless, tasteless, odorless) liquid we poured the sample
in was real water
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whether this sample really dissolved
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and even far afield
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that our senses and instruments aren't aren't deceiving us:
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optics, biology, psychology, mechanics involving
auxilliary hypotheses
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predictive success, likewise, accures to the whole body of statements en
masse
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Last gasp: Quinean attempts to tie down theories globally to observation
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"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual
matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics
or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges
on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science
is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict
with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior
of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements.
Re-evaluation of some statements entails re-evaluation of others, because
of their logical interconnections -- the logical laws being in turn simply
certain further statements of the system, certain further elements of the
field. Having re-evaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others,
whether they be statements logically connected with the first or whether
they be the statements of logical connections themselves. But the total
field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there
is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the
light of any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are
linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, except
indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as
a whole." (Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Section 6, pgph. 1)
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Revised assumptions:
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we can't isolate the T's from each other so that
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no T statement has an O bases of its own
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O-ness statements from the T-ness are distinguishable,
but only by degrees
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statements nearer to the experiential periphery are more observational
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[2+2=4]
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Acids are electron donors.
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Acids are water soluble.
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Water is wet.
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The stuff tastes sour.
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statements closer to the logical center are more theoretical: reverse the
direction
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O'Hear Contra Kuhn + my 2¢
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Kuhnian relativism holds that paradigms are incommensurable
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meaning there's no neutral rational basis for comparing theories
at the highest levels
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it all comes down to irrational preferences, influences, politics, and
taste
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i.e. "There's no objective neutral Truth
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there's only paradigm relative truths
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it's true for Aristotelians -- in their world or as they
see it
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when you're watching a "heavy body on a rope swinging back and forth on
a string or chain until it comes to rest"
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your seeing constrained fall
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it's true for Newtonians -- in their world or as they see it
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when you're watching a "heavy body on a rope swinging back and forth on
a string or chain until it comes to rest"
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your seeing a pendulum
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But neutral description and observation is possible
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examples
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Kuhn's own paradigm neutral description: "heavy body on a string or chain
swinging back and forth"
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Gallileo's observation of moons of Jupiter
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contrary to Ptolemaic expectations
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Ptolemaics can still see them through their telescopes
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space probes can visit them
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their existence is no more paradigm specific than that of the Gallapagos
Islands
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discussion
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granted: our observations are theory-laden in being conditioned
by theoretic persuasion or paradigmatic acceptance influening
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directions of interest and attention (where we look)
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and even, somewhat, our perceptions themselves (what we see in looking
there)
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there is no presuppositionless observation (contra Bacon).
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denied: our observations are paradigm-relative in being completely determined
by our theoretic persuations or pardigm acceptance
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devotees of different theories or paradigms
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still share a deal of prescientific & extraparadigmatic common ground
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presuppositons
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assumptions regarding similarity and dissimilarity
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interests, etc.
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My 2¢
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the Quinean holistic turn goes contrary to scientific relativism
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no matter how basic your paradigm or theory
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it will only be a piece of the continent, a part of the whole: total
science
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resulting commensurability
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the specific disagreement between competing devotees of competing
paradigms
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occur against a larger background of shared agreement about much
else
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and their dispute can be rationally ajudicated on this basis
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still open to more global cultural relativism
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that global paradigms completely determine our observations
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that different cultures have different global paradigms
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hence scientific world-view can't be rationally vindicated against
other world-views
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this may be resisted along similar lines
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even those with radically different global paradigms or cultures
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share basic human propensities, interests, and sensory dispositions
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that high-level theoretic persuations cannot override:
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the native paradigm may include bullets and antibiotics in its conceptual
catalog
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but the natives still fall when the bullets hit them
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and the antibiotics still heal their infections
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may be a universal human paradigm: of object recognition, tracking
abilities, etc.
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so that even the most different human cultures are minor variants
on underlying universal themes
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so, again, against this wider, deeper shared background agreement
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disputes between cultures or global paradigms can be ajudicated
on this basis
Observation and Theory
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Accepted wisdom
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there is no pure observational level
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free from any theoretical influence
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Background: Logical Empiricist search for a pure observational language
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phenomenalism: red patch here now, sour taste here now . . . doesn't get
us far
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too private & subjective:
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too episodic and ineffable
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physical thing language: talk of tables, chairs, ducks, people, etc.
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seemed to be objectionably theory laden
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carries with it all kinds of unverifiable assumptions
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expectations regarding the future behavior of the things
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uncheckable beliefs about their origins
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hypothetical or counterfactual beliefs
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about how they would behave
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if circumstances were different in various ways
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upshot: no pure observation basis adequate for scientific purposes
can be isolated
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Popper: "Here is a glass of water" v. "Here is an electron"
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if we take the former as basic or observational
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that's a psychological fact about us
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but this preference has no basis in any difference in the character of
the statements
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electron & water
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are thoroughly theoretical
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O'Hear: Logical Empiricists needlessly rending their shirts
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unable to have the whole loaf: presuppositionless -- theory pure -- observation
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they won't accept half a loaf . . .
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the half a loaf
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some statements are more observational: there's a smoky trail in
the cloud chamber
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than others: that's an electron trail passing through the cloud chamber
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water v. electrons
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the belief that a certain liquid is water
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may bring with it expectations about it's future, past, and counterfactual
dispositions
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that it will quench thirst
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that it will drown us if we try to breath it
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that it will boil if we put it in the teapot and the teapot on the stove
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which are not at all the same as holding any explicit theory about water
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upshot contra Kuhn
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interacting with things like glasses of water being what we're all humans
are programmed by evolution
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we don't just arbitrarily `decide' to take this level as basic or observational
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this basic level of observation -- our "lived world"
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being "related
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to our genetic inheritance
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and our needs and interests as human beings
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provides
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a common ground for communication -- and mutual criticism and comparison
of beliefs -- between people of different cultures
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a fortiori across paradigms
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between Western (influenced) scientists)
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pursuing basically the same enterprise
Empiricism
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"Observational" basis is there in the life-world conceptions & beliefs
all people more or less share
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given the similarity of our biology & sense organs
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and the similar behavioral dillemas all people & societies face regarding
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food & shelter
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fight & flight
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fraternization
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Empiricism -- the view that knowledge is anchored in sensory interactions
with the world -- is vindicated along these lines
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at the life-world level "changes in the world are most readily registered
as changes in our sensory experience"
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theory has to answer to these pre-theoretical everyday observations and
experiences (96).
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Remaining difficulty
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Much of our scientific knowledge is not about unobservable objects
and processes far removed from the life-world
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electrons, mesons, quarks, charm, spin,
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the Big Bang,
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etc.
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The difficulty: what's the relation
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between observable phenomena
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and the unobservable things that scientific theories describe
Unobservability and Underdetermination
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Unobservables
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things known only through their effects or theoretically posited to explain
certain effects
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cells, molecules, atoms, electrons, mesons, quarks? (query class: wut is
there?)
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a sliding scale depending on observational instruments & opportunity
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where's the line now?
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how low can you go?
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the lower
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the more dependent on technological assistance
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thereby assuming all the theory behind it
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conclusion
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instrument assistance yeilds diminishing returns
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observability diminishes to near zero for quarks & their ilk
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Underdetermination of theories by observational data
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data is like points on a graph
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any number of lines can go through all the points
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both the grue hypothesis and the green hypothesis agree with all the data
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always be indefinitely many alternative theories
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invoking radically different concepts & positing different sorts of
entities
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or rearranging ideas about familiar concepts & entities (if this is
conceivable)
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simplicity rears it's beautiful head again:
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What is simplicity? (isn't it in the eye of the beholder)
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What warrant is there for thinking the "simplest" curve most probable?
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Gripes about Gravity
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a suspect notion from the beginning
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acted instantaneously at a distance
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contrary to 1st methodological principle of mechanism: No
action at a distance.
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compare astrology
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compare Aristotelean elements seeking their natural place
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Newton himself resisted it & regarded it as a bit of an embarassment
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Kuhn tamed
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the importance of the methodological constraint of mechanism lends credence
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to Kuhns description of paradigms as encompassing standards
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and his revolutionary portrayal of the shift
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the shift from Aristotelian/Scholastic paradigm
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to Mechanistic/Newtonian paradigm
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incommensurability undermined
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paradigms can fall short by their own internal standards
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gravity was scandalous y the mechanistic philosophy's own lights
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Einsteinian revolution (the new paradigm) better by the old paradigms lights!
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gravitation explained by the curvature of space around material bodies
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not by any special force
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Berkeley's issue
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"As far as [gravitational] attraction is concerned it is clear it was not
introduced by Newton as a true physical quality but merely as a mathematical
hypothesis." (De Motu sec. 17 as cited by O'Hear, p. 102)
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gravity, according to Berkeley, is a counter introduced to enable mathematically
precise predictions of observed events
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but has no real reference to anything in the world
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there's this formula that predicts stuff F = [(M1*M2 / d2) *
g]
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no force of gravitational attraction to which this formula refers
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Newton's distinction
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phenomenological laws: correlations among observable phenomena
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hypotheses: about unobservable underlying causes
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If gravity interpereted as a mere phenomenological law
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the claim "that gravity does really exists and acts according to the laws
we have explained" (Newton as cited by O'Hear, p. 104)
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amounts to no more than "the observation that certain regularities in accordance
with the inverse square law obtain" ( p. 104)
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Berkeley's misgivings vindicated by Einsteinian reconstrual of "gravitational
attraction"
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as curvature of space
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Newton's law of universal gravitation still obstains: still predicts the
phenomena
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but there really is no force answering to the name of "gravity" answering
to
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Undertermination illustrated by the predictive agreement between
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the Newtonian occult force account
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and the Einsteinian curved space account
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Final Issues
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gravitrons?
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uncommon "observables"
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electricity (electrons?) when you stick your finger in the outlet?
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gravity every waking moment you're on earth?