Science and Culture

OHear: Chap. 9

Science exists in the larger context of civilization or culture, obviously
Traditional de-emphasis

science the objective study of things in themselves
accidentally dependent on culture

scientists on colleges for their educations & jobs
on funding for their projects
etc.

but essentially independent

objective inquiry
into the nature of things as they are in themselves
culturally neutral

no culture has the patent on science
different inquirers from different culture can be engaged in the same scientific enterprise

Contemporary reemphasis on cultural connections

internal developments in the philosophy of science

Kuhn's sociological & historical approach
In place of talk of theories and evidence in the abstract
Talk of concrete paradigms . . . philosophy of science becomes a kind of intellectual anthropology of

research communities
their practices,
their power structures,
their artifacts,
their values & norms.

"external" developments: "The Science Wars"

political suspicions

that science is a tool of ruling elites
that the scientific world view is essentially Western European
that imposing scientific beliefs on other cultures is a kind of intellectual colonization

destructive of other ways of knowing and conceiving reality
which are equally valid

objectivity is a dangerous myth because it leads to such imposition

scientific pretensions of certain social studies

background

title "science" is honorific
approaches to the understanding of sociology & psychology which may be

non experimental
not predictive
untestable

also aspire to the title

critique of scientism

scientism

the hard sciences -- physics and chemistry -- are the ideals
the social sciences should try to emulate the hard sciences, aspiring to

prediction and control of social & psychological phenomena
based on quantitatively precise measurement
and mathematically expressible causal laws

critique

the hard sciences -- physics & chemistry -- are not good models for the social & psychological sciences
sociology and psychology

need to take a methodological path
suited to their own subject matter

analogy: the attempt of sociology and psychology to ape the hard sciences is like

the drunk who one night dropped his keys on an ill illumined stretch of the road
then looked for around the corner, under the street lamp, because "that's where the light is"

application: the attempt by sociology and psychology to ape the hard sciences is counterproductive

results in methodology driven inquiry
instead of data driven or content driven inquiry
we determine the problems to be addressed

on the basis how can we use these tools
to the neglect what needs to be done

alternatives to scientism

verstehen or interpretive understanding

aim of social scientific explanation is not prediction and control
but understanding: behavior explained by

rethinking the thought of the doer
so that we see how what they did was reasonable
under the circumstances as they perceived them

other: neo-Marxist

social & psychological phenomena explained by
placement in the overarching narrative of

material development
class struggle
imperialism
impending revolution

science is not a neutral disinterested inquiry: not culturally nonpartisan

there's revolutionary science which serves the struggle for liberation
there's reactionary science which serves to maintain existing power relations
which side are you on?

Two notable difference between social science and physical science

self referential character of social scientific inquiry

social scientific practices are themselves
among the phenomena that social science is the study of

self fulfilling character of scientific predictions

Wittgenstein's example: "I'm going to take two powders, then I'm going to be sick."

I'm going to take two powders is one kind of predicting: voluntary self fulfilled prophecy
I'm going to be another be sick is another kind: based on causal generalization

Scientism based on the supposition

that causal generalization is the ticket to ride
and that self-fulfilling prophecies are not scientific predictions

good causal generalization based practice: I predict that the balance will show 10 g. when I put the sample on it

I put it on
I note what it reads
my prediction is fulfilled or falsified

bad self fulfilling prophecy based practice

I put it on
I lift up or push down on the balance pan with my thumb as required
to make it read 10 g.

Contra scientism: the self fullrilling prophecy kind of prediction has a central and legitimate place in social scientific practice.

re: social engagement: scientific activism

i.e., social scientific activity is not socially disengaged (looking down from above, so to speak)
social scientific acitivity is unavoidably engaged in the social struggles it chronicles

re: values

social science is engaged for good or for ill
social science is unavoidably evaluative not "value free" (as scientism has it)

e.g.: the neo-Marxist unapologetic reply to their critics

rather than give up your theory when it failed to come true
you're endeavoring to make it true (like putting your thumb on the balance pan)
reply: you bet your sweet bippy

we're trying to make it true
when we succeed our views will be validated
but it's not a cheat, as you suggest

that's the way social change happens . . . as a result of voluntary human acts
unlike the way mass happens.

Science as Mythology

Prologue: Enter Thales

Into a world in which mythical explanation was the norm

Question: why is there two configurations of stars up in the sky that look sorta like bears
Answer: you see Hera, wife of Zeus, got really pissed with these two dudes, and she turned them into bears and cast them into the sky.

Thales:

Question: what are things made of.
Answer: water.

Discussion

Explaining things in terms of their constitution
Not some fanciful "historical" narrative:

Homer or Hesiod proposes cool story about how it could have happened
everyone says Whoa! Cool dudes! And the story gets accepted.

Thales advance as much a matter of the question asked

"What are things made of?" as opposed to "What's with that bear-looking thingee up there?
maybe more a matter of the question asked: He was wrong about the water.

Separation of scientific explanation and philosophical speculation arose as a break away from

religious-mythological story telling tradition
that was -- and still remains in many quarters -- the dominant prevalent human way

of conceptualizing the world
and explaining its phenomena

under the religious-mythological dispensation

there still is practical knowledge of the world
though not so much in the form of theoretical knowledge that
but embedded in the practical know how of craftspeople, farmers, etc.

rules of thumb
standard procedures
etc.

Comtean Positivism: August Comte

Flower of 19th century scientific optimism
Positivist thesis:

Science can "give us positive knowledge" (202)

systematic knowledge of empirical laws
based on and checked through observation and experiment
which we know to be true

Replacing religious, mythological and metaphysical speculations

systems of tales and claims
that are not empirically testable through observation and experiment
which are merely believed, not known

either they're taken on faith
or they're just empty untestable philosophical speculations

Methodological high road to positive knowledge

avoid speculation beyond the observationally endorsable
including quasi metaphysical speculation as to unobservable essences of things

O'Hear's Thesis

"Science itself has become a mythology, perhaps the prevailing mythology of our time." (203)
Irony: We have me the enemy and they are us.

in the process of supplanting mythology & religion
science takes on the characteristics of myth and religion

Supporting Considerations: O'Hear's Argument

Science goes in for metaphysical speculation contrary to Comte's advice
Most practicing scientists are scientific realists

believe the unobservable processes and entities they hypothesize
really exist and are the true underlying causes
of everything else

everyday objects and their characteristics & behavior
and the phenomena we experience

scientific realism invests the hypothetical constructs of science with metaphysical import

scientific theories are "carve nature at the joints"
where science carves well, there there really are joints

That scientists and the public tend to "regard the wider claims of science" as far better grounded than they are

the sorts of claims that are "are far more tentative and justify far less confidence" than they're generally accorded
claims that are seriously underdetermined by the evidence

grand cosmological claims: about the Big Bang, etc.
micro-mini world claims: about atomic, subatomic, sub-subatomic particles

in this we see something like the "elevation of fascinating speculation into absolute truth" (204) characteristic of religion and myth

From psychoreductionism to psychoeliminativism: a cautionary tale

difficulties in adequately reducing the mental

no smooth fit between the categories of folk psychology

belief, desire, etc.: propositional attitudes
pains, itches, etc.: felt feelings or experiences

and the categories and structures in terms of which the causal activity of the brain is best conceptualized
means no reduction of the categories and concepts of folk psychology may be possible:

compare the fate of the ancient elements

water: reduced to H2O
fire: reduced to oxidation
earth: unreducible
air: unreducible

unreducible due to the categories earth and air being

inherently vague
and fitting into no natural kinds

the categories and laws that ultimately explain human behavior

of neurophysiology, presumably
will be totally unrelated to the categories of folk psychology

the categories and "laws" (such as they are) of folk psych. are

dispensable

we dispensed with the ancient elements
for the true ones (so we believe): H, He, etc.

misleading

continued comparison

still scientifically apt to speak of the water content of tissue
less so to speak of the air content
least so to speak of the earth content
fire content would be a weird way of talking about oxidation

psych. phenomena not upper level expressions of lower level neural processes

unlike solidity of ice

observable characteristic which is the appearance (to the senses)
of the unobservable molecular lattice structure (which is the underlying reality)

folk psych. is a would-be competing explanation at the same level as neuroscience

offer competing structures of different kinds of unobservables
purporting to explain the same upper level phenomena: behavior

analogy: folk psych. is to neuroscience

not as genetics is to biochemistry
but more as the phlogiston theory is to the oxidation theory

upshot: neuroscience v. folk psych.

neuroscience will win out
folk psychology -- at least for scientific purposes -- gets eliminated

there really is no phlogiston
and there really are not beliefs, desires, pains & pleasures

scientifically dubious metaphysical baggage of folk psych.

dualism

a subjective realm of inner experiences
apart from the objective realm of outer occurrences

free will

things get done or decisions made
that are not causally necessitated by anything else
when we voluntarily act
so we can be held morally responsible

and so on: puzzling features of intentionality

when I believed that Santa flew in a magical sleigh pulled by flying reindeer
what is the object of my belief: how can it be

about Santa and his magical sleigh
when there is no Santa or magical sleighs or flying reindeer

logical trouble we could do without: if equals are substituted for equals the results aren't equal

VALID:

DNA molecular structures can be altered by radiation
Genes are such molecular structures.
So, genes can be altered by radiation.

VALID

There is water on Mars.
Mars is the planet the probe is heading for.
There is water on the planet the probe is heading for.

INVALID

Mendel believed genes to be the fundamental hereditary units.
Genes are DNA molecules.
Mendel believed DNA molecules to be the fundamental hereditary units.

Sop to common sense

still, no doubt, folk psychological talk with have some commonplace currency

we'll still talk of "beliefs", "desires", "pleasures", "pains", etc.
as we still talk of "the sun rising"

but such talk will have no scientific standing

there is really no such thing as the sun's rising
and really no such things as beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains, etc., either.

Moral of the cautionary tale

Eliminativism combines equal parts

exorbitant wild-eyed speculation: promissory notes about future of neuroscience
a dearth of hard evidence

folk psych. predicts a lot . . . e.g. it predicted you'd be wearing shoes to class today
that is far beyond the ken of what neuroscience has predicted
which isn't all that much, even at more primitive physiological levels: eye blinks, etc.?

Extreme empirical and perhaps conceptual difficulties

empirical:

making an explanatory science of neuroscience
that is explanatory up to the large scale "molar" behavioral level

explaining & predicting not only the manner of our twitches, reflexes, etc.
but the more comprehensive comings, goings, and doings: what folk psychology predicts and explains

conceptual

ineliminabilty of consciousness

due to qualia being directly experienced
on some views -- e.g., phenomenalism -- qualia are the only things directly experienced

self-refuting argument: eliminativism about certain intentional states borders on incoherence

Eliminativism says there are no beliefs.
If there are no beliefs then eliminativism isn't belief worthy.
So eliminativism isn't belief worthy.
eliminativist response:

more promissory notes
when neuroscience progresses sufficiently it will provide suitable replacement concepts

for such 2nd level epistemological evaluative categories such as

warrant
evidence
truth
knowledge

along with the replacements for the 1st level psychological categories such as

beliefs
desire
pain

eliminativism:

not an empirically well supported hypothesis by a long shot
nor is it simply implied by commitment to scientific realism
more a piece of philosophical/metaphysical speculation
the proposal waxes mythological when it's backers style it

the scientific approach to understanding behavioral phenomena
and by implication, eventually, social phenomena

the tendency to disparage "folk psychology" in the name of hard-headed scientific realism

is a prime example of science as mythology
or as religion

The Myth of Science:

"The mythology of science may be regarded as the belief that science and scientific method (and they alone) can provide us with complete and satisfactory explanation of all phenomena."
A would-be conceptual objection: the bootstrap problem (similar to the self-refuting objection to eliminativism above)

scientific theories aren't just marks on paper

if the rain carves "F = ma" on a rock
it's not an inscription of Newton's second law
apart from our taking it so
the same applies to marks generated by computers (e.g., their printouts)

they have meaning only to us
the meanings we invest them with by interpreting them as meaningful as we do

they're about anything -- hence only theories -- insofar as we understand them as such: they are "themselves products of human agency and intentions, and intelligible as scientific theories only if regarded as such" (207)

quarrel about human "I would say `intelligent'"
and the question remains

"Are computers intelligent?"
"Does we include them?"

Conclusions

incoherence of eliminativism redux

a scientific would-be theory that denied the existence of understanding and the like
if true would merely be meaningless marks (and so not true)
so eliminativism is untrue & incoherent: would cut off the limb it sits on

more speculative conclusion: re thought or consciousness

consciousness is scientifically inexplicable
due to scientific explanation's dependence on consciousness
consciousness a scientific blind spot

our scientific inability to account for consciousness
sorta like your visual inability to see your own eyes

similarly (or alternately) normativity

normativity = evaluation

normative judgments are value judgments: You shouldn't wear your hat indoors.
opposed to factual judgments: You are wearing your hat indoors.

received view

the content of scientific judgments is value free
science tells us

what is, was, and will be
and what would be if

science doesn't tell us

what's good or bad
what should be

O'Hear! O'Hear!

materialism and eliminativism or reductionism

especially, regarding the mental and cultural phenomena
are not scientifically mandatory

scientific practice can survive the refusal to buy into the myth of science:

in this regard science is still unlike religion

plea for tolerance

science needs to be less prideful
and more respectful of

"lived human experience"
traditional beliefs and values: "the delicately balanced systems of value and meaning we have evolved over time for living our lives"

Myths and Science

Strong Programme in the sociology of science, holding "scientific knowledgen itself (or, more properly, what is called scientific knowledge at any given time) can and should be given a naturalistic explanation in terms of events and pressures external to science itself" (211)
O'Hear's Concedes

"There can be no doubt that scientists, individually and collectively, can be influenced by extra-scientific forces, including non-scientific myths" (211)
"There can be no doubt that scientific ideas come from many soures, scientific and extra-scientific." (211)

O'Hear Draws the Line: "None of this should dispose us to rush into a denial of the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification." (212):

"even in the process of formulating his theory, a scientist will be tempering his non-scientific inspiration" (212)
once "a theory has been cast in a scientifically acceptable form, its success or failure is not directly related to its conformity or otherwise to the non-scientific spirit of the age" (212-213)

it must "fit with nature" (213)
which it will be compelled to do by "the essential openness and competitiveness of the sientific community and the requirement of repeatability of observations and results" (213-114)

"[A]n atmosphere of free discussion in science ... militates against the domination of scientific thought-processes by ideological or self-interested forces" (216). Nevertheless

"It is important to insist that ciriticisms and alternative points of view have to be empirically well-grounded before there is any duty on the part of the scientific community to attend seriously to them. Scientific rationality is not impugned by the failure of scientists to take flat-earthers, creationists, or believers in mystic lines of force seriously." (216n1)

Science and Technology

Two perspectives on the value of science

classical conception: knowledge for its own sake: scientific knowledge is intrinsically good
pragmatic conception: scientific knowledge is instrumentally good

scienctific knowledge is valuable insofar is it contributes to "the relief of man's estate" (Bacon)
"Progress is our most important produce" (corporate slogan of GE?).

O'Hear: have it both ways

with Aristotle & Popper, acknowledge the intrinsic worth of scientific knowledge
recognize that scientific knowledge is power

as such it can be used for good or ill
"And if the scientific community is, ideally, a microcosm of the open society, in that criticisms and ideas are admissable from any quarter, it may well follow that a politically open society is the best arena for an acceptable evolution of technology, for in such a society, the citizens will be free to choose among competing technologies, and to draw public attention to, and if necessary legislate against the unacceptable effects of existing technologies." (222)

Science and Value

Against the Frankenstein Fear: "there is nothing in science itself which implies that one should intervene recklessly in nature and disturb the natural order, without carefully monitoring the effects of what one does." (223)
Pressing the worry some say "there is something inherent in the concept of science itself, as a value-free investigation into aspects of the natural world, which makes it of necessity a destructive and malign influence on society"

scientific thinking being (supposedly) value-free
such thinking conduces to amorality and ethical nihilism
would be ethically destructive argument

Only scientific beliefs are credible.
Value judgments are not scientific.
:. Value judgments are not credible.

Maxwell v. Huxley (to the tune of The Ballad of Werner von Braun)

Sir Andrew Huxley: "in the long run the value of science depends entirely on its conclusions being independent of wishes and fears about their practical application" (qtd. p. 225)
"Maxwell urges that knowledge is valuable only to the extent that it is knowledge of valuable truth which helps us to `live life lovingly', as he puts it." (225)

O'Hear agrees with Huxley: "The advocacy of science which conflates questions of fact with questions of value will not produce either good science or better reflection on value questions of value." (231-232)

Science is a kind of impartial arbiter of facts.
Determinations of value (besides truth) are the province of other disciplines and institutions

religious
artistic