Putnam, Hilary.  1962.  The Analytic and the Synthetic.  In Mind Language and Reality: Collected Papers Volume 2, pp.33-69.  First published in Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, III,  University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN.

On the other hand, I want to suggest that the term 'energy' is not one of which it is happy to ask, What is its intension?  The term 'intension' suggests the idea of a single defining character or a single defining law, and this is not the model on which concepts like energy can be construed.  In the case of a law-cluster term such as 'energy' , any one law, even a law that was felt to be definitional or stipulative in character, can be abandoned, and we feel that the identity of the concept has, in a certain respect, remained.  (53)

But [to say 'bachelor' is not a law cluster concept] is to say theat there are no exceptionless laws of the form 'All bachelors are ...' except 'All bachelors are unmarried', 'All bachelors are male', and consequences thereof.  Thus, preserving the interchangeability of 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in all extensional contexts can never conflict with our desire to retain some other natural law of the form 'all bachelors are ...'. (57)
    This cannot happen because bachelors are a kind of synthetic 'class'.  They are not a `natural kind' in Mill's sense.  They are rather grouped together by ignoring all aspects except a single legal one. (57)

But bachelor is not now a law-cluster concept; I think we can say that, although it is logically possible that it might become a law-cluster concept [if exceptionless laws about bachelors were discovered], in fact it will not. (59)

[Definitional stipulation] can do no harm because bachelor is not a law-cluster concept.  Also it is not independently 'defined' by standard examples, which might only contingently be un-married men. (59)

In the first place, in deciding whether or not a word is a 'law-cluster' word, what we have to consider are not all the laws (including the unknown ones) containing the word, but only those statement which are accepted as laws and which contain the word.  It does not even matter if some of these are false: if a word appears in a large number of statements (of sufficient importance, interconnectedness, and systematic import0 which are accepted as laws, then in that language of that time it is a 'law-cluster' word.  And second, if a statement would be accepted as true, but is regarded as so unimportant that it is not stated as a law in a single scientific paper or text, then it can certainly be disregarded in determining whether or not a word is a 'law-cluster' word. (67-68n)

The word 'atom' is an example of a word that was once a 'one-criterion' word and which has become a 'law-cluster' word (so the sentence 'atoms are indivisible', which was once used to make an analytic statement, would today express a false propositon). (68)

Putnam, Hilary.  1975.  The Meaning of 'Meaning'.  In Mind Language and Reality: Collected Papers Volume 2, pp.217-271.

The reconstruction required by methodological solipsism would be to reconstrue jealousy so that I can be jealous of my own hallucinations, or of figments of my imagination, etc.  Only if we assume that psychological states in the narrow sense have a significant degree of causal closure (so that restricting ourselves to psychological states in the narrow sense will facilitate the statement of psychological laws) is there any point in engaging in this reconstruction, or in making the assumption of methodological solipsism.  But the tree centuries of failure of mentalistic psychology is tremendous evidence against this procedure, in my opinion. (220-221)