What does consciousness do?

Chapter 3: What Does Consciousness Do?

"nerve firings in the visual system must somehow give rise to a conscious experience"
"the conscious experience must somehow cause more nerve firings to direct the appropriate action" (p. 37)

"In some ways, the better we understand brain function, the worse the problem becomes." (p.37)

"In the nineteenth century, as physiologists began to understand reflex arcs and nerve function, the problem loomed even larger [than for Descartes].
The more we know the more the the details the fewer the unaccounted links in the causal change where consciousness might be interjected, the more Huxley's claim that we are "conscious automata" seems to be borne out.
James objected (1890, 1: 38) "that 'to urge automaton-theory upon us ... is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of psychology."
The more we come to know, however, the less the impertinent it seems: "The ordinary view is that our subjective feelings and conscious volitions cause our actions. Yet when we study the intricate workings of the brain, there seems to be no room for them to do anything." (p.37)

initial intuitive conviction that it happens as the naive model says
challenged by the speed of these responses
never mind that they're mysterious, how is there time for all these m-b conversions?

experimental evidence suggesting "a dissociation between fast motor reactions and conscious perception"

Would-be (neurology based) explanation: functionally dissociated "visuomotor control" and "visual perception systems in the brain

initially plausible ... much as the body reactively withdraws my hand from the fire before the pain has time to register, so my body proactively guides my racket before the visual experience registers it.

"These findings suggest that conscious perception of the ball depends on processing that is too slow to play a role in guiding the fast catch. So although the causal sequence seems to be [as the naive model says] we now know that it cannot be."

Moral: be cautious in making claims about what consciousness does based on how it feels.
Our privilege knowledge of consciousness -- if such there is -- does not extend to its causes & effects.

Dualist interactionism -- as advocated by Descartes or Eccles & Popper -- "provides a simple and unambiguous answer to the question here. The difference between the same action being carried out either consciously or unconsciously is that in the first case the [immaterial] self-conscious mind had a desire or intention and caused the brain to carry out that intention by interacting with it. In the second, the brain processes acted along without interference from the self-conscious mind." (46)

Higher Order Process (HOP) Theory: what makes a mental state or process conscious is being the object of an inner perception. Being introspectively "seen in the minds eye" as it were.
Higher Order Thought (HOT) Theory: what makes a mental state or process conscious is is being the object of a higher order thought"

previously I wasn't consciously aware of the sound of the air conditioner: I was hearing the air conditioner but not thinking "I'm hearing the air conditioner"
but when my attention is called to it I think "I am hearing the air conditioner" my so thinking (this higher order thought) is what causes me to be consciously hearing
Blackmore's objections

HOT theory would entail organisms incapable of something like reflective self-awareness, thus denying the consciousness of many (most?) nonhuman animals
HOT theory might entail that mystical experiences -- which mystics describe as not involving thought of any kind -- were not conscious experiences.

Functionalism -- for present purposes -- is the view that, essentially, mental states and processes are, computational states and processes

most find its accounts of intentional mental states -- e.g., beliefs and desires -- most persuasive
and its accounts of phenomenal or qualitative states -- e.g., itches, afterimages, lemony-tastes -- least persuasive

"When we ask what is the difference between actions carried out consciously and those carried out unconsciously, the functionalist would answer in terms of the different functions [data processes] involved." (48)

Dennett: to be conscious a being must have "higher-order information states that are about its other, lower-order informational states."

unconscious processes -- e.g., knee jerks, burn-response, fast-skilled-acts -- are special purpose peripheral processes
conscious processes -- e.g., deciding what to watch on TV -- invoke general purpose central processes.
like Descartes' interactionist theory with central processing in the place of the soul

Baars: consciousness is "a facility for accessing, disseminating, and exchanging information, and for exercising global coordination and control" (1997a: 7)
LH: Baars theory is a functionalist theory with the "global workspace" being "central processing" (as I have been calling it).
SB's objection: GWT doesn't solve (or even seem to engage) "the hard problem"

"His theory might be understood as a description of how integration and global control of actions is achieved by a complex brain, but then there is no need to bring in subjective experience as well. ... We still do not know why there is something it is like to be a system with a global workspace ...." (49)
LH: This objection applies to functionalism, more generally, and is the source of the aforesaid unease about functionalism's ability to account for qualia.